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In the past decade utilization of computers has
increased well over tenfold in the Federal Government as a
whole. The Department of Defense is the world's largest user
of automatic data processing equipment. Within the DOD various
automated systems have come into being as a direct result of
improved automated data processing capability. Such areas as
systems analysis, command and control, material logistics,
communications, financial management, management information,
personnel, medicine, and research and development have been
particularly subject to the influence of the computer. The
Office of the Secretary of Defense, principally since 1961,
has fostered standard systems having DOD-wide application.
Material logistics systems in particular have been
the target of much standardization. A degree of uniformity
now exists within the DOD in such areas as requisitioning,
issue, accounting, transportation, and material priority
systems. However, at the same time there are indications that
greatest efficiency through systems standardization and more
economical use of ADP resources has not been possible because
of the lack of an overall approach to planning and development
of automated material logistics systems.
The need for a total systems approach to the development
1

2of automated material logistics systems is not newly recognized,
nor is there unanimity as to such need. At a minimum, the matter
is controversial. Nevertheless the enactment of Public Law
89-306 in 1965 has had a tremendous impact toward the development
of a total systems approach. Increased central direction and
interest in standard systems at the OSD level has undoubtedly
provided additional impetus and strong influence. Concomitantly,
within the Department of the Navy, in addition to receipt of
increased central direction from the OSD, practical success with
the Polaris Project and other projects has dictated a growing
awareness of the benefits of a total systems approach.
Significant steps have been taken within the DOD and the Navy to
achieve more effective systems planning and development.
Indications are that such progress is continuing on an
accelerated basis.
If the automated material logistics system is looked
upon as an integrated whole, made up of a number of subsystems
of varying complexities, the potential problem of a lack of
interface between systems can be seen as a stumbling block to
developing a total system. The role of the information system
is receiving increasing attention by experts, and is thought to
be of considerable significance in, and an integral part of,
achieving system interface. It would appear that management
information systems may be of similar significance in achieving
an integrated or total systems approach to automated material
logistics systems development.
This paper will examine the role of the information

3system in the evolution of the total systems approach to
automated material logistics systems planning and development
in the Department of the Navy. It will consider some of the
background factors which have fostered the approach, will
examine the progress to date by looking at some of the on-going
material logistics systems as well as present plans within the
Navy for achieving further progress toward a total systems
approach to material logistics systems development. Finally,
an evaluation will be made and conclusions drawn with respect
to the progress to date and in the future.
To adequately treat the dominant aspects of the subject,
the breadth of coverage has necessarily been limited in order to
ensure depth of coverage. There has been, therefore, no attempt
to include in this paper all existing thought and opinion with
respect to the "total systems approach." A synthesis has been
developed, however, based on the research conducted and the
material examined, which the writer hopes will serve as the
basis and background for the thesis. Similarly, no attempt has
been made to examine all the material logistics systems and
subsystems in being- -such an examination and evaluation would
extend well beyond the reasonable physical limits and purposes
of the paper.
The organization of the paper is intended to lead to an
evaluation of the main research question, which is a determina-
tion of the extent of progress to a total systems approach to
automated material logistics systems development in the Navy.
Chapter I is a discussion of the theoretical aspects and

4current thought about a total systems approach, and the
integrative nature of the systems process. The chapter concludes
with a synthesis of what a total system is, the steps involved in
systems development, and the dependent conditions and advantages
of the total systems approach. Chapter II discusses the
relevancy of management information systems to the total system
approach. Chapter III views the environmental aspects in which
the approach has evolved. Chapter IV analyzes some of the
material logistics systems which have been developed within the
Navy, as well as some typical interface relationships that exist
with systems of the DOD and other departments. Chapter V
describes on-going efforts within the Naval Material Command in
developing a total systems approach for material logistics
information systems. The final chapter (VI) provides an overall
progress evaluation of the total systems approach and its
possible future role in material logistics systems development.

CHAPTER I
THE TOTAL SYSTEMS APPROACH
As indicated in the introduction the writer purports to
show the evolution of the total systems approach to automated
material logistics systems development in the Department of the
Navy.
In this chapter it is intended to discuss the concept of
a total systems approach . Its evolutionary aspects as applied
to automated material logistics systems development will be
discussed in Chapters III and IV, respectively.
There is no unanimity as to the meaning of "total
systems". There are those who contend that while conceptually
possible, practically speaking; "total systems" is not feasible--
that it is a myth.* There is evidence, too, that the term "total
systems" is rather loosely used with no consistency as to its
meaning. It seems all the more appropriate therefore to provide
an understanding of the term, which may fit the context of this
paper, in order that any conclusions we may derive will be valid
within the framework of our definition.
1W.M.A. Brooker, "The, Total Systems Myth", in
Management Systems
, ed. by Peter P. Schoderbek (New York: John
Wiley $ Sons, Inc. , 1967), pp. 163-169.

Some Theoretical Aspects
Before defining "total systems" and "total systems
approach", the meaning of the term "system" itself should be
examined. The dictionary defines system as follows:
. . . 1 . An assemblage or combination of things or parts
forming a complex or unitary whole: a mountain system ;
a railroad system . . . . 3 . an ordered and comprehensive
assemblage of facts, principles, methods, etc., in a
particular field: a system of philosophy . 4. any
formulated, regular, or special method or plan of
procedure. 5. a method or manner of arrangement or
procedure. 6. a number of heavenly bodies associated
and acting together according to certain natural laws:
the solar system . ... 8. Biol a. an assemblage of
organs or related tissues concerned with the same
functioning unit. 9. a method or scheme of classifi-
cation. . . . 13. the structure of society, business,
politics, etc. . . . *
Further defined is "systematize" as "to arrange in or according
to a system; reduce to a system; make systematic. "* A leading
text on systems theory and management states:
A system is "an organized or complex whole, an assemblage
or combination of things or parts forming a complex or
unitary whole". The term system covers an extremely broad
spectrum of concepts.-^
. . . it will be helpful to define systems more precisely
as an array of components designed to accomplish a
particular objective according to plan . There are three





which the system is designed
to perform. Second , there must be design, or an
established arrangement of the components. Finally, inputs
•*- The Random House Dictionary of the English Language :
College Edition
,




Richard A. Johnson, Fremont A. Kast, and James E.
Rosenweig, The Theory and Management of Systems (2nd ed.;
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 4.

of information, energy, and materials must be allocated
according to plan .
1
In their discussion of "The Utility of System Models and
Developmental Models for Practitioners", Warren Bennis, et al
.
,
indicate the concept of system encompasses the components of
organization , interaction , interdependency , and integration of
parts .
A company in the aircraft industry, with reference to
hardware systems, has defined "system" as "the sum total of
parts making up a whole , including their interactions which
operate within established (a) performance limits, (b)
operational constraints, and (c) design constraints while
achieving stated mission objectives".
There appears to be a common thread running through
these definitions. All definitions can be construed to include
the assemblage, combination, array, or arrangement of parts
,
things, components into a complex, unitary whole, structure or
organization . Thus, a more pervasive definition would appear to
include the interaction (communications) , interdependency
(mutual need) and integration of the combination of parts into a
unitary whole by means of a preconceived, designed plan to




^Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne , and Robert Chin,
The Planning of Change
,




3Robert E. Corrigan and Roger A. Kaufman, Why System





(Long Beach, Calif.: Douglas Aircraft Group
,
reprint date May 1965), p. 36.

8more pervasive meaning of "system" seems to carry with it an
infusion of thought other than the mere mechanistic and
authoritarian connotation of "the classicist school" 1 (or
scientific management 2 ) . (What is seen is a parallel to the
evolution of new management organization theory and policy,
where a true interdisciplinary approach is advanced, oriented to
a situational environment. This matter will be discussed more
fully in Chapter III in its relation to the evolutionary aspects
of the total systems approach.)
A real-world application of a system is seen in the
business organization which can be viewed as a man-made system
having interplay with its environment- -customers , competitors,
labor organizations, suppliers, government and other agencies.
It is a system of interrelated parts working in conjunction
with each other in order to accomplish a number of goals, both
those of the organization and of the individual participants.
. . . The aim of systems theory for business is to
facilitate better understanding in a complex environ-
ment; that is, if the system within which managers
make decisions can be provided as a more explicit
framework (italics mine) , then such decision-making
should be easier to handle. But what are the elements
of this systems theory which can be used as a frame-
work for integrated decision-making? Will it require
wholesale change on the part of organization structure
and administrative behavior? Or can it fit into exist-
ing situations? In general, the new concepts of the
various organizational and management schools can be
applied to existing situations. Organizations will
Edmund P. Learned and Audrey T. Sproat, Organization
Theory and Policy : Notes for Analysis, (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), pp. 3-4.
2Joseph L. Massie, Essentials of Management
,
(Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), ppT 13-15.

9remain recognizable. . . .
. . . we want to emphasize the notion of systems as
set forth in several layers. This connotes basic
horizontal organization cutting across typical depart-
mental lines. Thus the systems that are likely to be
emphasized in the future will develop from tasks,
projects, or programs, and authority will be vested
in managers whose influence will cut across traditional
departmental lines. The focus of attention is likely
to turn more and more to patterns of material, energy,
and information flow throughout organizations.
Identifying information-decision systems will provide
a useful means of analysis and synthesis. These
concepts will be developed more fully throughout this
book.
1
If we view the business organization as a system of
interrelated parts combining to seek certain goals, we may also
see the primary force within the organization to be management,
which coordinates the activities of the parts or subsystems into
accomplishing the goals. The theory of systems concepts closely
relates to a general theory of management that has evolved in
recent years, which focuses attention on the fundamental
administrative processes essential to an organization if it is
to meet its primary goals and objectives. "These basic







where human and physical resources are combined to meet certain
7
obj ectives " . (italics mine) The processes are necessary in all












finance, communications, et al . The processes have been
described in many ways, although four basic functions have
received general acceptance— planning , organizing, controlling
and communicating . A slightly different description would be
the processes of organizing, planning, leading, and controlling.
Another breakdown, expressed in terms of the key functions of
management would be: decision making, organizing, staffing,
planning, controlling, communicating, and directing.
Irrespective of what we call the functions or processes
required in management, and we shall use planning, organizing
,
controlling , and communicating , the functions constitute the
structure, the means, and the measure, as well as provide the
environment, in which the decision-making process is carried out.
Essentially, management is the process whereby unrelated resources
of men, material, machines and money are integrated into a total
system for objective accomplishment. The total management
process involves coordinating the four functions in order to meet
3the over-all objectives of the system.
As the management process ideally involves the systematic
coordination and integration of planning, organizing, controlling,
and communicating, so does the systems approach to management
involve these same processes. The making of management decisions
1William H. Newman, Charles E. Summer, and E. Kirby
Warren, The Process of Management: Concepts, Behavior, and





3Newman, The Process, p. 16.
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in an atmosphere of no_ system results in hazardous or chaotic
situations
.
Current Thought and Direction
The systems concept is not necessarily new. One can
think of a ship on the high seas as a system with elements of
planning, organizing, control and communication evident therein--
and ships have been on the high seas for centuries, however
simple or complex those systems be. The pervasiveness of
systems concepts is most evident in recent years however.
The trend toward automation envolves implementation of
systems concepts. Automation suggests a self-contained system
with input, output and a mechanism of control. Automation as a
concept recognizes the need to consider the environment within
which the automatic system must perform. Thus the automated
system can be recognized as a subpart of a larger system. Large
groups of machines can be programmed to perform a series of
operations, with automatic materials-handling devices providing
the connecting links among the components of the system. In
such a system, each individual operation could be described as a
system and could be related to a larger system covering an entire
operation. The particular processing operation also could be
part of the total enterprise system, which in turn can be
visualized as a part of an environmental system. Another
commonplace example today are the completely automated






While the above examples deal, at least partially, with
physical processes, other aspects of automation have seen the
systems concept utilized. A phase which has been automated, and
one which is pertinent to this paper, is information flow. With
the introduction of large-scale, electronic data processing
equipment, data processing systems have been developed for many
applications including material logistics systems with sub-
systems for physical distribution of materials and paper work
processing.
The science of managing material flow from the raw
material stage through the many stages of processing and
including the distribution of the finished product, is called
2
rhochrematics. The idea embraces systems concepts where
emphasis is placed on the total system of material flow rather
than on functions, departments or institutions which may be
3involved in the processing. As applied to material flow
management, the rhochrematics approach involves (1) reviewing
the need for the function in terms of the objectives of the
system, and (2) determining its cost and contribution in
relation to other necessary functions. "A new conceptual






. , p. 193.





of rhocrematics on the industrial scene, i.e., the adoption by
management of the view that movement of goods from raw material
to consumer is a flow process which must be planned, organized,
directed, and controlled as an integrated system." 1 The authors
go on to say that acceptance of the view by top management is an
essential prerequisite to the successful implementation of the
system. Management support is crucial to the rhochrematics
process of describing, simulating, analyzing, and ultimately
changing the major flow of material and information throughout
the entire business system.
It was cited earlier that in one sense the concept of
system incompassed the components of organization, interaction,
interdependency , and integration of parts. The word "integration"
is defined in the dictionary as "1. The act or an instance of
combining into an integral whole. "^ It can be seen that the
definition of "integration" is closely related to the definition
of "systematize"--"to arrange in or according to a system", as
referred to previously. It is possible to think in terms,
therefore, of an integration of systems (or systems integration)
or a systematizing of systems where many systems are integrated
into a super-unitary system or total system. By way of
continuing the development of this point, it might appear
The best way to view the system is by describing the
flow process, analyzing each segment, and investigating
the relationships and contributions of the parts to the









and study to those segments which fail to optimize their
contribution to the total system . 1 (italics mine)
The vitalist theory of deduction states:
1. The whole is primary and the parts are secondary.
2. Integration is the condition of the interrelatedness
of the many parts within one.
3. The parts constitute an indissoluble whole that no
part can be affected without affecting all other
parts
.
4. Parts play their role in light of the purpose for
which the whole exists.
5. The nature of the part and its function is derived
from its position in the whole and its behavior is
regulated by the whole to part relationship.
6. The whole is any system or complex or configuration
of energy and behaves like a single piece no matter
how complex.
7. Everything should start with the whole as a premise
and the parts and their relationships should evolve.
A business firm, a government agency, or perhaps a
segment of a military service (functional or organizational) can
each be considered as an integrated whole where each system,
subsystem, and supporting subsystem is associated with the total
operation. Its structure, therefore, is created by many systems
arranged in hierarchical order. The output of the smallest
system becomes input for the next largest system, which in turn
furnishes input for a higher level. Today, however, practically
speaking, a truly integrated total operation, while possibly





^L. Thomas Hopkins, Integration: Its Meaning and
Application
,




The Total Systems Approach
The total systems approach is essentially a concept of
management. Whether with systems engineering, management
engineering, business management, information systems management,
material logistics systems management, or other functions or
skills, the total systems approach is a way of thinking, frame of
mind, or philosophy, rather than any certain body of knowledge or
body of techniques.
In each of these categories of endeavor the concept
provides a framework for visualizing internal and external
environmental factors as an integrated whole. It recognizes the
systems concept and the functions of subsystems and more complex
supersystems and their interface and interrelationships. The
concept fosters a way of thinking which, on the one hand, helps
to dissolve some of the complexity and, on the other, helps the
manager to recognize the nature of complex problems and thereby
operate within the perceived environment. It is important to
recognize the integrated nature of specific systems, including
the fact that each system has both inputs and outputs and can be
viewed as a self-contained unit. It is also important to
recognize that the business/material logistics systems are part
of or interact with larger systems on a possibly industry-wide/
defense-wide scale or with society as a whole.
The meaning of the term "total systems", as used in this
1Johnson, The Theory, p. 3.
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paper, does not infer the complete processing of information or
the monitoring of an organization by computer, i.e., completely
machine-automated without human control or intervention. The
meaning, rather, implies a man-machine system which is oriented
to the hierarchy of goals and objectives that man has
established for the whole (total) system or organization.
It has previously been indicated that the system concept
is not new- -yet the advent of automatic data processing systems
have made feasible the reality of utilizing a total systems
approach in systems management. The automatic data processing
system has provided the means by which vast amounts of information
can be communicated throughout the system for decision-making
purposes. The total systems concept can be defined as an approach
to systems design that conceives the organization as an entity
composed of interdependent systems and subsystems, which, with the
use of automatic data processing systems, provides timely and
accurate management information which will permit optimum manage-
ment decision-making
.
The organization, viewed as a supersystem (superior),
system, or subsystem (subordinate) , whether a government or
private organization, program or project follows certain steps or
phases in its functioning to reach its goals or objectives.
Assuming the goals or objectives have been established by
•J-Asa T. Spaulding, Jr., "Is the Total System Concept
Practical?" , in Management Systems
,
ed. by Peter P. Schoderbek
(New York: John Wiley § Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 149-153.
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management these steps in systems development are followed:
1. Management makes its initial decision , selecting
from among several alternatives the projects it wants to
initiate.
2. A plan is developed, with a forecast of appropriate
systems needs and resources required.
3. Policy is established, that is, the framework and
guidelines for accomplishment of the particular project,
including criteria for evaluating results.
4. Design of the detailed system is carried out,
including development of system procedures and the selection of
the methods and techniques for carrying out the project.
5. The project is implemented .
6. The results phase of the project is reflected by
information feedback, including records and reports.
7. Evaluation of the project is conducted by comparison
and analysis of the results with the established criteria.
The evaluation of the entire project (system) results in sub-
sequent management decisions to carry on, modify, or cancel the
project. Nothing revolutionary is contained in the steps which
are with slightly varying modifications common to many system






U.S., Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary,
Instruction 5200.14, Management Information and Data Systems ;
plans and procedures for coordination oF] 3 November 1965.
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The project is systematically coordinated and integrated
by the basic management processes (earlier described) of planning,
organizing, controlling, and communicating. The process of
communicatijig is the connecting and integrating link within the
project- -the communication network ties together each step of the
system. In the total management system the use of automatic data
processing systems provides the medium for the information flow,
and in addition provides the central control mechanism which
permits interpretation of information received and decision-
making.
While theoretical from a conceptual standpoint, the total
system approach can be developed into a practical and workable
system. The practical application of the concept into a viable
system depends, it appears to me, on the following dynamic
conditions
:
1. Top management backing . Foremost of all pre-
requisites, is the genuine interest and strong backing of the
highest (strategic) levels in the organizational hierarchy in
achieving a fully integrated total system. Top managements
interest can easily be measured in terms of resources allocated
for development and implementation of the system.
2
.
Thoroughly defined and understood goals and
objectives . Goals must be congruent with those of any super-
system, and completely translatable into subordinate subsystem
Allan Harvey, "Systems Can Too Be Practical", in
Management Systems , ed. by Peter P. Schoderbek (New York:
John Wiley § Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 154-162.
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objectives down through the management control level to the
lowest operational level. Objectives must be expressed in
concrete, rather than abstract terms and state desired system
output at each level.
3. Filtered information . System output must be filtered
horizontally or vertically as required, to be reflected as
specifically comprehensive information to be utilized at each
level or in each function for decision-making purposes.
4. Communications linkage . The communications process
is of utmost and basic importance to the design of the system,
linking the subsystems together and thereby facilitate the
information filter. Communications is the information
transporter.
5. Automatic data processing capability . While not a
requisite of an information system, per se, ADPS can be the
facilitating medium for controlling and communicating between and
among subsystems and functions. ADP is a tool through which a
total system is made feasible, and without which it would not be
practical
.
6. Building block capability . The subsystems are the
building blocks by which the total system is constructed. The
concept requires that the subsystems be individually compatible
with the totally integrated system. The contribution of each
subsystem in terms of information need and redundancy must be
considered.
7 Optimum standardization of functional systems /
subsystems and integration of data base . Balancing between

20
subsystems and total system is necessary to achieve optimization.
8. Integrated data bank . The data bank would contain,
on a central or remote basis, as required, integrated data for
all levels of the organizational hierarchy, available as informa-
tion for functional as well as total system requirements.
9. Competent developmental staff . Both technological
and managerial competence of high order to convert top management
objectives into integrated systems and subsystems to comprise the
total system.
The advantage of the total system approach could be
expressed in many ways to suit the situation to which the concept
is applied. Simply stated, it allows optimum visibility of the
full range of factors through the flow of information to the
decision-making process at all levels. The interrelationship
of the total systems concept to management information systems




The Science of Information
An understanding of information systems is founded on the
theoretical conceptual foundations of information science- -the
theoretical discipline associated with mathematical applications,
systems design and other information processing concepts. It is
an interdisciplinary science, concerned with the contributions,
efforts, and skills of librarians, logicians, linguists,
engineers, mathematicians, and behavorial scientists. An
information system can be seen to result from the application of
information science.
While communications implies information, a distinction
can be made between "communication" and "information". Communi-
cations connotes intercourse by words, letters, or similar means,
and involves interchange of thought or opinion- -that is a means
of transporting. Information, on the other hand, concerns, in
its broadest sense, that which is communicated. Information,
*H. Borko, "The Conceptual Foundations of Information
Systems", Paper read at the symposium: The Foundations of Access
of Knowledge







the substance of communication systems, is conveyed both
formally and informally.
A distinction can similarly be made between "data" and
"information". Data are individual facts or statistics which may
be, by themselves, only factual material having no particular
meaning--such "raw" data may be used as the basis for reasoning
or decision, or input to an information system (manual or
automated). Not all data is information, and "information" to
one person may be only "data" to another. Data existing in a
management information system, must be "screened" within the
system before it becomes meaningful information . The distinction
that becomes apparent between data and information is the idea of
meaning which may be considered a primary characteristic of
information.
According to Peter Drucker, of the "empirical" school of
organizational and management philosophy, the one particular tool
a manager has at his disposal is information. He does not handle
people--he motivates, guides and organizes people to do their own
work by passing information in the form of spoken or written
words or numbers. ^ The importance of information passed through
the communications process, is a keynote of modern management
philosophy— of the "human behavior", "social system", and
"management science" schools, as well as the "empirical" school--
which recognizes the truly interdisciplinary nature of
information science.
^Peter Drucker, The Practice of Management (New York:





What Is A Management Information System ?
A management information system is "the total process by
which raw data is collected, summarized, or processed and
reported- -with the emphasis on the ultimate reporting to manage-
ment", by means of a simple manual process or by use of off-line
or real-time computers or combinations of several systems and
methods. Paul R. Saunders, director of management information
systems for American Airlines goes on to state that in a manage-
ment information system the primary concern is with information
rather than the method used to collect, accumulate, or interpret
the data, and provides the following explanations to clarify the
point
:
Data vs. information . The terms "data processing"
and "information processing" are not interchangeable. . . .
Data exist in a management information system, but the
objective of such a system is to produce data which have
meaning and usefulness, i.e., "information" for decision-
making .
Information management vs. management information .
Mo s t commerical systems in use, and most of those stil
1
being designed, are concerned with the managing of
information or the achievement of more economical methods
of collecting, transporting, processing, and displaying
information. Much of the information being generated by
today's automated systems is valueless for decision-
making.
Policy vs. operational decisions . The information
requirements of executive management are different from
those of middle managers, who are required to make the
more immediate operational decisions. However, a manage-
ment information system can be designed to serve either
or both of these needs.
Dec is ion -making vs. decision- supporting . Computers
make management decisions only under restricted circum-
stances and, even then, only in relation to highly routine
1 Paul R. Saunders, "Management Information Systems", in
Systems and Procedures: A Handbook for Business and Industry
,
ed. by Victor Lazzaro (2nd ed. ; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), pp. 425-426.
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process. Computers can and do perform decisions by
observing prescribed threshold limits. . . . But when
introduced into a policy-level decision-making
environment, the role of the computer is that of
providing relevant information to support a higher,
managerial level decision-making process.
In summary, a management information system is
an organized method of providing each manager with
all the data, and only that data which he needs to
make decisions at the time he needs it, and in a form ,
that aids his understanding and stimulates his actions.
The ultimate goal of an effective management information
system is to keep the various levels of management completely
informed on all developments which affect them in the business.
Those persons placing information into the system should know
what data to collect and to tabulate, and management has the
obligation to clearly define its requirements for internal
information.
The Importance to Management
It was previously stated that communication implies
information and that information is the substance of communica-
tion, the connecting link in the management process. With
respect to the management process, the importance of information
should be evaluated in terms of its pertinence to the decision-
making process, where it is the basic ingredient.
The importance of information to higher levels of manage-
ment may be clearly seen in the following list of purposes for
1 Ibid., pp. 426-427.
2James D. Gallagher, Management Information Systems and
The Computer
,




which the top manager (executive) needs information:
1. Appraising results . Measuring results accomplished
against objectives established for subordinate levels. Measure-
ments can be broad, or can be compared on a recurring basis with
established standards.
2. Warning of major troubles . Most executives receive
at least one of the following barometers: regular reports;
notification of exceptions—deviation from norms or standards; or





Insuring that policies and standard methods are
being followed . Some audit methodology where the executive would
be advised on an exception basis, often by staff personnel.
4 Information for dealing with exceptional problems .
Exceptional problems may be an indicator that operations are out
of control. Such problems must be examined, although extensive
use of the exception principle may be very time-consuming.
5 Grounds for giving pre-action approval . Thorough
background information necessary for strategic matters.
6. Setting long-range plans, new policies . Information




Building up background for outside contacts .
"Briefing" essential for obtaining current relevant information--
good public relations and sound business practice.
8. Coaching and umpiring . Supervisory role of the
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executive dictates that specific situational information be
available.
From the preceding list it may be sensed that the
executive moves from one important situation to another. He
should not be paralyzed by too much of the wrong kind of informa-
tion, and should not be bogged down with excessive recurring
detail. Information should be available someplace where the
2
executive can obtain it as he needs it.
Many leading companies suffer from an information crisis
often without fully realizing it. The problem of inadequate
information lies in the gap that exists between a static informa-
tion system and the changing organizational structure. Adequacy
of information is determined, not in the sense of there not being
enough, but in terms of relevancy for setting objectives, for
shaping alternative strategies, for making decisions, and for
measuring results against planned goals. The trouble is that in
most companies it is taken for granted that information necessary
for performance of a manager's duties flows naturally to the job.
While to a certain extent true in small organizations, it is not
true in larger organizations. The cornerstone of building a
compact, useful management information system is the determina-
tion of each executive's information needs. The key to the






information is to conceive of information as it relates to two
vital elements of the management process—planning and control.
Again, the important consideration in determining adequacy of
information is the quality rather than the quantity.
The organization as well as management itself can be
viewed as a hierarchy. The hierarchy is ordinarily depicted as
a pyramid with top management, or the executive at the apex of the
pyramid, responsible for the basic strategic planning decision
functions of the organization. Middle management occupies the
center of the pyramid, responsible for management control func-
tions. At the base of the organizational/management pyramid is
the operating level, responsible for operational control of the
organization. John Dearden finds fault with completely equating
the three classes of functions with the three levels in the
organizational pyramid. He does this with some justification,
inasmuch as it is evident, for instance, that middle managers are
concerned with operational control problems as well as management
control problems. While the distinction between strategic plan-
ning, management control, and operational control is not
completely determined by the hierarchy within an organization
and realizing that top management may occasionally exercise some
D. Ronald Daniel, "Management Information Crisis," in
Management Systems
,
ed. by Peter P. Schoderbek (New York: John
Wiley £ Sons, Inc. , 1967), pp. 53-55.
2
John Dearden, "Can Management Information Be Automated?",
in William F. Boore and Jerry R. Murphy, The Computer Sampler :
Management Perspectives on The Computer (New York: McGraw Hill
Book Company, 1968), p. 341.
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strictly operating level functions and vice versa, the concept of
a hierarchy does, nevertheless, serve well for purposes of
illustrating the importance of certain kinds of information to
each of the three levels.
In accordance with the hierarchical model, management's
functions can be classified as follows:
1. Strategic planning , which consists of (a) determin-
ing corporate policies and objectives; (b) deciding on any
changes in these policies and objectives; and (c) deciding
on the resources to be devoted to attaining these
objectives
.
2. Management control , which consists of (a) dividing
the strategic plans into logical subdivisions; (b) provid-
ing the funds to carry out the subdivisions of the plan;
(c) assigning the responsibility for carrying out each of
the subdivisions of the plan to some individual; and (d)
following up to see that the assignment is being
satisfactorily carried out.
3. Operational control , which consists of (a) determin-
ing the specitic men, equipment, material, and information
necessary to accomplish the subdivision of the plan; (b)
assigning these resources so that the plan can be carried
out in the most efficient manner; and (c) comparing actual
results with plans and taking corrective action where
appropriate.
*
By way of clarification, for practical purposes, strategic
planning may be thought of as deciding on long-range plans and
objectives; management control, as supervising and evaluating
operational personnel; and operational control, as carrying out
the day-to-day operations of the business.
The foregoing has equal applicability to the Department
of the Navy. The Navy can be viewed as a hierarchical structure,









are integrated by a communications network through which flows
the stream of information necessary to perform strategic
planning, management control, and operational control.
The structure of management information systems in the
Navy closely parallels its management structure. The three
levels may be equated to the Secretarial level (executive or
strategic planning) , the Command level (headquarters/system
commands) , and the Operating level (fleet and shore activities)
.
Similarly to Dearden's model, it is better not to
consider as fixed the association of the three management
functional classes with the three Navy organizational levels, but
rather to consider that any organizational level may be involved
with a problem normally associated with a management function at
a higher or lower level. The hierarchy generalization, neverthe-
less, holds true.
At each of the three management levels there are three
different kinds of information. Inherently different, the
information inputs and outputs at the lower or operating level
tends to be transactional in nature, subject to recurring or
scheduled reporting, and thereby comparatively susceptible to
automated communication networks. To a lesser extent, the middle
or management level lends itself to condensed information output
and inputs, in the nature of information requests and demand
reports. At the top or executive planning level comparatively
little of the output information from the operating level is
direct input for decision-making purposes, the category of
information required being of a special request nature in support
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of decisions. Thus the aggregation of automated information from
the operating level to the top cannot be vertically condensed in
any responsive manner. To be sure, the availability of automated
data (as contrasted to information) is present for theoretical
filtering to the top, however the gap between the theoretical and
the practical have not been bridged as yet.
The problem is not one of quantity output from the
operating level, as was earlier pointed out, but rather an
inadequacy in the format, responsiveness, and materiality of the
information that is presented to the executive level for decision-
making purposes. This is, in the Navy, a result of the complexi-
ties of the organization, facilities, and weapon systems and the
virtual plethora of management support systems in existence (not
to mention the socio-political-economic factors that contribute
in considerable degree to the complexity)
.
The complexities of weapons systems, the demand for
information at the top, and the enormity of the Navy organiza-
tion, as with the Defense establishment as a whole, has resulted
in a proliferation of management data systems at the management
level. Within the Naval Material Command (NMC) some 200
automated management information systems with 2,500 reports and
a larger number of manual systems at the headquarters level were
in existence in 1967 to enable managers at all levels within the
NMC to carry out their responsibilities. To the extent that the
T.J. Rudden, Jr., Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, "Management
Information Systems: The Life Blood of Management", Defense
Industry Bulletin
,
Vol. 3, No. 1 (January 1967), p. 12
.

systems are non- integrative and non-interfacing in design their
value to support the executive level decision-making process is
limited. Currently, because of the lack of system interface and
integration, few of the systems communicate with one another. As
a result inordinate demands for information have placed on the
operating level to provide input to the systems. The problem is
recognized, and the Navy has embarked on a major project effort
to develop an integrated system, the Navy Logistics Information
System (NAVLIS) . NAVLIS is the subject of Chapter V.
Essentials Of A Management Information System
It is important to design an information system that
supports control in the integration of the management processes.
A flood of information flows through an organization by informal,
face-to-face communications and by regular, formal reporting. To
be assured of good control, a reporting system is needed--
probably with at least some minimum formal reporting. Every
manager should ensure that the report system in-being provides
the right kind of information, to the right people, at the right
time to enable effective control. The myriad of controls that
exist within an organization give rise to the diversity of
arrangements for information feedback. Based on the idea that
self-control is the best way to get corrective action, feedback
loops should be as short and quick as possible. Members of
organizations should generally have direct access to information
relevant to the performance of their work without having to go up
and down the hierarchy to get it. Periodic review of reports
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flow should be made to ensure adequacy of content, receipt and
timing
.
In the design of an information system, manual or auto-
mated, a major challenge to the system designer is to integrate
the organization's data base so that all levels of the organiza-
tional and management hierarchy may utilize the information that
derives from the data base in the communications process. It can
be seen that if the designer can be made aware of the total
information needs of the organization, a positive first step to
total system design is taken. The purpose of any information
system is to communicate to the appropriate level, information
which will aid in the decision-making process. The design of the
system, however, must in reality be a compromise between a mutual
understanding on the part of management and the system designer
as to what is to be contained in the system, on the one hand, and
the capability of the system, on the other hand, to process and
communicate the flow of information (or data)
,
irrespective of
whether the system is manual or automated. The capability of
automated data processing equipment to process vast amount of
data is acknowledged, as are the limitations of any given level
of organization to assimilate such data in terms of objective and
valid information. The capacity of automated data systems to
produce reports on a routine basis is likewise recognized, as is
the lack of capability of automated systems to produce meaningful
information (as opposed to data) on a demand basis to a given
Newman, The Process, pp. 753-755.
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level of organization without inordinate delays or prohibitive
programming costs.
Because the computer seems to promise an improvement
in the availability and quality of information- -which would
meet a universal need- -computer-based management informa-
tion systems (MIS) are much discussed in management journals
today, but many of the hopes now pinned to such systems seem
to be derived from the acuteness of the need rather than the
real likelihood of success.
1
Ridley Rhind reflects the thought of a large body of expertise in
the industrial, educational and defense world, where it is
contended that while computer-based information systems can be of
great value to management, nevertheless many of the claims for
computers are unfounded. The tenor seems to be that judgement
still remains with management and will continue to so remain for
some time to come. A real danger is seen in believing that total
reliance can be placed on automated management information
systems for information needed in the decision-making process.
John Dearden believes that:
- Complex computer-controlled systems solve a limited
type of management problems
.
- For the most part, only the lower levels of manage-
ment are directly affected by automatic information systems.
- The techniques that make present computer systems
successful to not apply at all to more general management
problems
.
- Attempts to apply these techniques to more general
information systems can have serious consequences for the
companies that try.
2
Before considering automation, the adequacy of the
Ridley Rhind, "Management Information Systems: "Some
Dreams Have Turned to Nightmares", Business Horizons , June,
1968, p. 37.
p. 339.
Dearden, "Can Management Information Be Automated?",
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existing information system should be the primary concern of
management, particularly with respect to the strategic planning
and management control. The faults of an on-going inadequate
information system cannot be corrected solely by use of the
computer. Since an automated system can be used for only certain
types of information, generally those of an operational nature,
the attempt to automate all management information regardless of
nature or place in the hierarchical structure is the wrong
approach.
1
The computer can best be utilized in processing informa-
tion that possesses these general characteristics:
1. Interacting variables . The ability to perform
arithmetic and logic operations with tremendous speed with
mathematical models.
2. Reasonably accurate values . The need to express
accurate relationships among variables, where the results of
calculation are no more valid than the assumptions on which the
calculations were based.





5 Need for accuracy .
6. Large amounts of information .








computers in MIS is that their utility is greatest in aiding
management of operations . The utility of computers in MIS
designed to aid in strategic management is questionable, and
their utility in the management control process is only slightly
less so."-'- Citing three successful industrial applications of
computer-based MIS, which he called logistics control systems, he
attributes their success based on: (1) well-structured operating
problems; (2) limited objectives, in the short term at least; and
2
(3) high-volume processing of routine transactions.
With respect to strategic planning and management
control, Rhind has this to say:
Even the most ambitious computer-based MIS restricts
its field of vision to the history of events occurring
within the corporation. Strategic management concerns
itself with predicting the future and preparing to make
the most of the opportunities that it offers. Since
these opportunities by definition are frequently
opportunities that the company has not yet grasped, I
fail to see how an MIS with an internal and historic
focus can be of very much help.
Managers charged with strategic planning or the
administration of management control systems are
unlikely to benefit significantly from the use of the
computer to improve information available to them. The
most important reason is that they must exercise a great
deal of discretion in their work, whereas the informa-
tion they consider is often relatively basic--some
gained from "unofficial", or informal sources, and
some from the accounting system.
3
Rhind sees the key to designing a successful, workable






computer-based MIS is to deliberately limit its scope in terms
of:
(1) the audience for which it is designed- -and I
would seek to serve managers charged with the smooth
daily operation of line departments such as marketing,
shipping, warehousing, transportation, or production;
and (2) the data involved- -and I would concentrate on
logistics systems or on some special situations such
as the DOD system . . . *-
John Dearden, along with F. Warren McFarlan, classifies
information in yet another way for determining whether it lends




Action vs. non-action .
2 Recurring vs. non-recurring .
3 Documentary vs. non-documentary .
4 Internal vs. external .
5 Historical vs. future .
^
It is the action , documentary , recurring , internal , and
historical types of information that are the primary candidates
for automation. Conversely it appears that the opposite types
are prime candidates for elimination from automation. The
importance of good systems analysis is seen in the determination
of whether or not to automate an information system.
Since non-documentary information is virtually impossible




^John Dearden and F. Warren McFarlan, Management
Information Systems: Text and Cases (Homewood, Illinois: Richard




information that is normally beyond organizational "control",
such as external and futuristic information, is not likely to
be automated, and, of course, the higher the echelon in an
organization the more important such external and futuristic
information becomes to the decision-making process.
It was previously indicated that it is the responsibility
of management to inform the system designer of the needs to be
contained in the information system, and the responsibility of
the designer to comprehend the total system. Prior to installing
a management information system, according to Joseph I. Barnett,
Vice President of the Standard Program Corporation of New York,
management must insure:
1. Adequate organizational discipline in order that
common interfunctional procedures can be implemented.
2. Documentation of potential savings anticipated from
installation of the system. The documentation must include
reasonable supporting data to substantiate the savings, and to
justify the investment of organization resources for such an
undertaking.
3. A relatively stable management, especially at the
policy-making level. Continual reorganization is not conducive
to an environment effective systems design and installation.
Paradoxically, a management information system, if properly
designed, will help stabilize an organization as a result of the




4. That management is willing to commit its own time
and interest to understand the various plans, techniques and
equipment associated with the proposed system. Management should
be aware in sufficient detail to enable intelligent monitoring of
the costs and progress of the system.
5. The willingness of management to acquire and train a
core of experienced systems personnel, ranging in size from one
man in a small organization to a full staff of twenty or more in
a major organization.
6. The presence within the organization of operational
personnel who are knowledgeable in depth concerning the informa-
tion requirements, methods, procedures, and techniques within
the functions they are associated with. These personnel will
play a major role in the design and implementation of such a
system. Management must be willing to relinquish considerable
time from the regular duties of these personnel for additional
duties as members of the design and installation committee.
What is described above is a key ingredient to a successful
management information system development project- -the importance
of top management support is crucial to the success of the
system.
The first step in the design of a management information
system is the same as the first of the management processes
discussed in Chapter I, that of planning. For any systems
Joseph I. Barnett, "How to Install a Management
Information and Control System", Systems and Procedures Journal
,
XIX (October, 1966), pp. 10-14.
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project a plan must be developed and approved before work is




To develop an integrated management information system
for the entire organization.
Steps :
1. Organize a study team comprised of representatives
from all major activities of the organization. Most full-time
members of the team should be experienced systems personnel from
the organization's systems department (or management information
systems division) . Assign responsibilities and establish target
dates for completion of each phase.
2. Review and document all present reporting systems and
reports throughout the organization. (It may not be necessary to
detail each step of the data processing systems.)
3. Interview all levels of management concerning their
information needs, in light of both of the present reporting
system and future requirements
.
4. Develop recommendations for immediate improvements as
they are recognized. After approval by management, schedule and
oversee installation of these immediate improvements.
5. Design a new management information system as required
and prepare a written proposal to management for approval.
Include a schedule for installation, operating costs (and savings




6. After appropriate approvals, install the new
system.
The Need For A Navy Material Management
Information System
In an article in the Defense Industry Bulletin, RAdm.
Thomas J. Rudden, Jr., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Material
(Programs and Financial Management) stated succinctly the Naval
Material Command's case for Management Information Systems.
"Everything that a manager does ultimately comes down to
decision-making, and the science of management is the art of
organizing facts for the decision-making process.' Gone are
the days when managers used to keep everything in their heads.
Management technology has provided a major leap forward in the
business of assembly and retrieval of facts.
. . .
The complexities of manageing NMC [the Naval
Material Command] requires formally organized
management information systems, both automated and
manual, which are geared to providing managers at
all levels:
- Data to support program proposals and requests
for funds.
- A means of assuring that statutes, agreements
with Congressional committees, and other require-
ments originating outside the DOD relating to
resources are complied with.
- Information that is necessary to formulate
objectives and plans, monitor their execution, and
isolate problem areas with a factual basis for
corrective action. The law of the exception applies
here, namely, concentrate on those areas and facets
which are above or below planned performance.
^
Saunders, "Management Information Systems", pp. 432-433




The development of data systems has evolved slowly in
the NMC, as well as in the Navy as a whole. Initially only
manual systems, concentrating on material and financial records,
were used where required to operate in various functional
organizations. More sophistication was introduced: tabulating
equipment and then first-generation computers. From this
functional orientation to material data systems came the
beginnings of the information systems that exist today in the
NMC.
Long-range goals were established as early as 1959.
Requirements for features and concepts were cited which
envisioned an integrated navy management information system by
1970. However by the mid-1960 's it became apparent that the
long-range goals would slip, primarily because of rapid
technological development, both in ADP and in weapon systems,
and because of the growing systems proliferation.
Now the reasons were more urgent than ever- -systems were
becoming more non- interfacing and non- integrative in nature- -and
the way was pointed toward a much needed totally integrated
information system that would serve top management's decision-
making process, as well as the needs of all levels of management
down to the operating level. The emphasis on support of the
operating forces, identified the primary management problem to
be a totally interrelated and interdependent end product, namely
U.S. Department of The Navy, Office of the Secretary,





the material support of the operating forces. The NMC manage-
ment process recognizes management information systems as a
supporting process- -the objective of management information
systems being "to fill that void" between what management knows
2
and what management needs to know.
The Chief of Naval Material also saw the need for an
"Advanced Management Information System" which would incorporate
necessary management information improvements to provide for
effective functioning at the top management level in the NMC.
The need was corroborated by contractor findings which indicated
that improvement was possible and stated that the following
principles and system characteristics should be pursued for
further development:
- The system must first satisfy requirements for
information essential to the accomplishment of the
mission of the CNM.
- It must be primarily responsive to the manage-
ment information requirements of the CNM and his
senior staff.
- It must support the task of control, i.e., the
management functions of monitoring, evaluating,
reporting, coordinating, establishing policy,
guiding and directing.
- It should not duplicate other NMC systems.
- It will, therefore, generally be concerned with
selected summary information produced to a large
degree by the operating systems of lower echelons.
Further it was intended that any system developed would be
mutually supportive of the lower echelons of the NMC and be
Rudden, "Management Information", p. 13.
2
U.S., Department of the Navy, office of the Secretary,
Instruction 10462. 7B, Automatic Data Processing Program
,
11 March 1966, AppH, Principles and Concepts
,
p. H-ll.
Rudden, "Management Information", p. 14.
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compatible with their internal management information systems.
In supporting the goals of the NMC, a management
information system concept was developed with the following
features
:
- System design to fit into logical place in the total
management system, i.e., cross relating of NMC programs where
required by coding and data elements standardization (e.g.,
where weapons project management and resource management systems
have interfaces)
.
- System interfaces integrated into a coordinated
management system and a coordinated supporting information
system for use of NMC's system (functional) components and
project management components.
- Information required to perform the management mission
of each of the three management echelons (i.e., headquarters,
system command/project manager, field activity levels) would be
defined by that echelon.
- NMC headquarters level would insure a total system
integrated data base for the NMC management information system.
Through the use of the annual Management Information Systems
Plan, a requirement of higher Navy and DOD policy, guidance is
provided for the evolution of new material logistics information
systems development.
In spite of steady progress towards development of an





accordance with many of the original goals and concepts, the
initial 1959 Department of the Navy objectives for mechanized
data systems have slipped. However, in November of 1968, a new
approach to Navy material logistics systems development was
undertaken. The urgency and criticality of need for the
development of a total material logistics information system
was recognized by the establishment of the Navy Logistics
Information System (NAVLIS) Special Project (PM14)
.
^U.S., Department of the Navy, Headquarters Naval
Material Command, Instruction 5430.38, Navy Logistics
Information System (NAVLIS) Project (PMlfr) , 29 November 1968.

CHAPTER III
THE ENVIRONMENT OF AN EVOLUTION
Historical Beginnings
The environment of the evolution toward a total systems
approach to planning and development had its beginnings at least
in World War II and by close look it can be seen earlier.
The forerunner of the current trend to integration has
from time to time been seen in the need for greater coordination
between the military services. The responsibilities of the
Army and Navy up to the time of the Spanish American War could
fairly well be drawn by a line of demarcation between the land
and the sea. "Generally the problems of the oceans were left to
the Navy and those of the land were left to the Army". As a
result of recognized poor organization and inefficiency of the
Santiago Expedition and jurisdictional disputes over newly
acquired overseas possessions, central planning and advisory
organizations came in to use in both the Army and the Navy, with
emphasis for some needed mechanism of coordination at a level
below the President. These organizations generally suffered
C.W. Borklund, The Department of Defense (New York:




because of the lack of working staff and probably the lack of a
total commitment to joint coordinated effort on the part of both
departments. The first such joint effort was the Joint Army and
Navy Board in 1903, which was comprised of senior officers. It
served as a forum for consideration of matters requiring
interservice cooperation. It was the first faint appearance of
unification in the military.
World War I pointed up serious problems regarding the
waste of time, money, and resources caused by conflicting
demands on the nation for war material and from uncoordinated
procurement. The emergence of airpower and its value as a
significant military weapon came to the forefront as an issue in
the 1920's. Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell in
testimony before Congress advocated a third service- -the Air
Force, but at the same time urged Congress to coordinate all
national defense under a Secretary of Defense. There were
numerous studies and bills presented to Congress regarding a
unified organization to handle military affairs during the
period 1921 to 1945. The greatest push to unification came
during the Depression when, as an economy measure to save $100
million, it was proposed to establish a single department for
2defense. The proposal was narrowly defeated in Congress.
As a result of events and circumstances of World War II,
by 1946 unification was being given serious consideration.
Harry B. Yoshpe and Stanley L. Falk, Organization for








Key pressures were the constantly increasing
responsibilities of the chief executive; U.S.
assumption of Free World leadership in the face
of increasing Communistic aggression; the
technological revolution, heralded first by
military aircraft and later by atomic bombs,
etc.; the success of combined operations of the
Army-Navy-Air Force in World War II battles; and
the rapidly rising costs of developing modern
weaponry, as weighed against growing public demand
for economy in military spending.!
"The creation of the Department of Defense resulted from
the clear recognition that separate land, sea, and air warfare
is gone forever". The National Security Act of 1947 which
established the Department of Defense did not provide for a
unified department or even a federation. A confederation of
three military departments was created instead, presided over by
3
a Secretary of Defense with carefully enumerated powers. Almost
immediately on taking office, James Forrestal , the First
Secretary, in his efforts to make the loose confederation work,
recommended that "the statuatory authority of the Secretary of
Defense should be materially strengthened ... by making it
clear that the Secretary of Defense has the responsibility for
exercising 'direction, authority, and control 1 over the depart-
ments and agencies of the National Military Establishment". In
Ibid .
, p . 6
.
2Robert S. McNamara, "Managing the Department of Defense",
Civil Service Journal
, Vol. 4, No. 4, (April-May 1964), p. 1.
J Charles J. Hitch, "Evolution of the Department of
Defense", Excerpt form the H. Rowan Gaither Lectures in Systems
Science delivered at the University of California on 5-9 April
1965.
4First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948
(Washington^ U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 3.
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1953, and again in 1958, additional steps were taken to
strengthen and increase further the responsibilities and
authority of the Secretary, especially with regard to the
operational direction of the armed forces and in the area of
research and development. "The three military departments were
no longer to be 'separately administered' and instead were only
to be 'separately organized'." In 1958, in addition, the
chiefs of the military departments were taken out of the chain
of command with regard to operational control of the unified and
specified commands, where previously they had been serving as
executive agents. The chain of command would now run from the
Secretary via the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the unified commands
but by-passing the military departments. President Eisenhower
said, "Genuine unity is indispensable ... No amount of
subsequent coordination can eliminate duplication or doctrinal
conflicts which are intruded into the first shaping of military
programs". 2
Charles J. Hitch stated that there was little unification
in fact from 1947 to 1961 except in three areas: unified commands
had been created in all overseas theaters and for continental air
defense; Joint contingency plans established for use prior to the
outbreak of hostilities— a first; and the civilian Secretaries
^"Special Message to the Congress in Reorganization of
the Defense Establishment, April 3, 1958", Public Papers of the
Presidents
, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958 (Washington: U.S.





had taken control of the over-all level of the Defense budget in
line with the federal budget, but with little effective control
over expenditures because of the lack of the management
techniques to do so.
Global commitments growing out of the U.S. position of
world leadership, and the vast strides made in communications
and means of transportation had shrunk both the time and
distance factors which influenced relationships throughout the
world. The international problems of the U.S. and its military
2problems were clearly indivisible.
The trend to increased central direction at the Depart-
mental level and systems integration was evolving.
Technological Revolution
It has been pointed out that the systems concept is not
new, however, the capability to exploit the concept has only
been with us for a relatively short time. While the decade of
the 1960 's might be called the "era of the system" its impetus
was as a result of the decades of technological breakthrough
that preceded it.
The prodigious expansion of the American economy from
the early 1900' s to the present has been to great degree as a
result of the techniques of mass production and mass transporta-
tion. In each of these areas, the application of systematic
1 Ibid.
McNamara, "Managing the Department", p. 2.
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ways of accomplishing the tasks of both men and machines have
made more complex the processes of industry. Mass transporta-
tion heralded first by the railroads, then the rise of the
trucking industry in the 1920' s, and finally air transport from
the 1950 's to the present, with the latter, with its
tremendously increased capacities, assuming more of the total
burden.
The physical sciences have played an important role in
the technological revolution. The introduction of radio in the
1920* s and the improvement in the telephone have both been
significant contributions to the improvement in the field of
communications, which has together with transportation narrowed
the time and distance between people and places. The develop-
ment of thermal nuclear energy has altered many of the
traditional concepts of war, making instantaneous holocaustic
destruction, on a world-wide scale, a possibility' to be given
the highest priority to prevent. The development of electronics
through practical application in World War II, singly had
tremendous impact on the development of the industrial and
military applications of today. The weapons system concept was
a result of combining electronics and communications with the
weapon into an "integrated" system.
With all these technological advances, however, came
the requirement to manage the new technologies and the complex
processes which produced the products of the new era. The
information explosion was in evidence. The new processes
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produced tremendous amounts of data, but the problem was one of
sorting the voluminous data into meaningful information. "For
the most part, the kind and form of information flowing to top
management was not commensurate with the decisions they had to
make."* Information theory which had its origins with the
scientific research that accompanied the wartime development of
radar, contains new insights into controls for production pro-
cesses, organization and management. Information technology is
built on the foundations of theory and of physical advances in
2
electronics, optics, and other related sciences. Information
technology and computer technology have both advanced at an
accelerating rate in the past twenty-five years.
The utility of the first generation of vacuum tube
powered, application-oriented, scientific computer, was largely
surpassed by the second generation of transistor-circuited,
procedure-oriented computers which could perform computations
in micro-seconds instead of seconds. About 1964, the third
generation of computers came on the scene with their micro-
miniature circuitry, 50 to 100 times smaller in size and
performing at fantastic speeds in nano-seconds. Third genera-
tion computers are oriented to problem solving and are by output
comparison to previous generations low-cost. Their capability
1Robert Beyer, "A Positive Look at Management Information
System", Financial Executive
,
(June 1968), p. 51.
John Diebold, "The Application of Information
Technology", in Management Systems , ed. by Peter P. Schoderbek
(New York: John Wiley $ Sons, Inc., 1967), pp. 47-48.
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is many times over that of previous generations with random
access and mass on-line storage, and are well suited to systems
integration. Evidence indicates that computer capability in
the 1970' s could well exceed ten times the capability of
today's computer at one-fifth of the cost.
More and more man is becoming increasingly aware of the
importance of the science of ecology. The interdependence of
man, nature and science is seen clearly in the field of space
exploration. The technological revolution has given us the
tools to develop ways to better manage ourselves and our
environment. The proper understanding of the capabilities of
the tools available, and the interrelationships of the various
disciplines used in systems management, offer a means by which
a total systems approach can be used in the planning and
development of automated material logistics systems.
Increased Central Direction and Control
The evolving process toward greater centralization has
been on a Federal-wide level, as well as within the military
sector. The growing tendency to more involvement of the various
departments and agencies in the Federal Government in centrally
directed programs has steadily increased since the Depression
years--largely a result of changing norms of social responsibil-
ity. As was discussed in a previous section, a growing need had
'John F. McCarthy, Jr., Associate Professor of Business
Administration, George Washington University. Lecture before
the Navy Financial Management Class. 12 March 1969.
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been experienced for greater coordination, if not control, at
higher levels in matters of defense. This need, culminated in
the establishment of the Defense Department in 1947, was
recognized by the President, the Congress, and to a greater or
lesser extent by the military departments themselves. Despite
the new department, until 1961, the military still largely held
sway and ran things.
The McNamara Revolution
Secretary McNamara immediately upon appointment started
implementing the broad powers already vested in the Secretary
of Defense from the National Security Act of 1947 and its
subsequent amendments. He later said:
. . . it became clear that either of two broad
philosophies of management could be followed by a
Secretary of Defense. He could play an essentially
passive role--a judicial role. In this role the
Secretary would make the decisions required of him
by law by approving recommendations made to him.
[What previous Secretaries had done for the most
part.] On the other hand, the Secretary of Defense
could play an active role providing aggressive
leadership- -questioning , suggesting alternatives,
proposing objectives, and stimulating progress.
This active role represents my own philosophy of
management. In talking to Mr. Gates and thinking
about his experiences, I became convinced that there
was room for and need of this kind of management
philosophy in the Department of Defense.
1
It was soon apparent that the Department of Defense was run by
the Secretary of Defense.
Part of the evolving process, was a growing recogniza-
tion of the need for considerable modification of the National
•McNamara, "Managing the Department", p. 2.
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defense strategy. The doctrines of "a bigger bang for the
buck" and of "massive retaliation", policies of the previous
decade were eventually seen to be unrealistic. The inability of
the military to conduct effective conventional war because of
its having "all its eggs in one basket" was pointed out by
General Maxwell Taylor in the The Uncertain Trumpet
,
which
influenced the change in strategic policies instituted by
McNamara. The twin strategic doctrines of McNamara were the
"controlled response" and the "conventional option" which were
designed to make things less bad. The doctrine of "controlled
response" is, in essense, a control mechanism placed on massive
retaliation where nuclear targets can be selected (e.g., the
sparing of population centers but the destruction of military
targets). The "conventional option" is the capability of
meeting threats and fighting wars with other than nuclear
weapons. Such an "all contingency" defense posture, infinitely
complex in programming and development, and together with the
increased cost and complexities of weapons and weapons-related
systems during the last twenty years of the "technological
revolution", would be dependent on administrative and manage-
ment techniques that had not heretofore been utilized on a
Departmental-wide basis. This was the McNamara legacy--the
business of defense.
Required, were tools and techniques to assist in the






decision-making. Needed, was the means to determine what
forces were necessary and the methodology to procure and support
them as economically as possible. The Planning-Programming-
Budgeting concept was the outgrowth of this need. Beginning
with an examination and an analysis of the military contin-
gencies faced by Defense throughout the world, the planning
process entails determining force and support level objectives
and specifying the future actions to accomplish the mission
requirements. "To be really meaningful the defense program must
be looked at in its entirety with each of its elements consid-
ered in light of the total program. This can only be done at
-1
the Department of Defense level". (Italics mine) The 5-year
program was thus devised. Programming is the process of
translating force and support requirements into manpower and
material resources which are time phased to meet planned
objectives. The original nine principal interservice missions
constituted the total program. The most important of the
missions are the strategic offensive forces, which are
essentially comprised of the B-52, intercontinental ballistic
missiles and the Polaris forces. A significant thing is that
the programming concept is mission oriented from a National
viewpoint- -the importance being in the mission and not the
service which performs the mission. The 5-year program
presents the proposed Force structure and the related costs.
Each mission, and systems and projects within the mission, can
^McNamara, "Managing The Department", p. 3.
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be broken down, for instance, into numbers of planes, the invest-
ment involved, operating costs and personnel requirements. Com-
peting programs are judged on their contribution to the mission
to be accomplished and to the Defense effort as a whole. What is
sought is a balanced defense posture. The total program is trans-
lated into the budget, which is the process of expressing the
programmed manpower and material resource requirements in finan-
cial terms for funding. Thus there is a rational process of
selecting, from among an array of alternatives, that combination
that will provide the greatest defense within a given budget. No
longer is an arbitrary amount of money given to each service to
spend as it would to meet the objectives as interpreted by that
service.
The judgment required in determining the proper balance
between systems and programs cannot be limited to intuition or
past experience alone. The range of choice is too broad; the
number and type of alternatives too great. The technique of sys-
tems analysis or "quantitative common sense" was introduced to
aid in the decision-making process. Systems analysis aims to
assist the decision-maker by furnishing quantitative estimates of
each of the alternative courses of action, on a cost-benefit or
cost-effectiveness basis. It can be applied on a national level
or on a functional or weapons system level. "System analysis
provides the means for consideration and integration of all func-
tions necessary for successful mission accomplishment and
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emphasizes the optimization of total systems performance".
There has been much criticism, especially in the early
years, of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting concept and of sys-
tems analysis. Early criticism seems largely aimed at the
aspects of both concepts which removed to the level of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, the ultimate decision-making powers
previously lodged within the military services. However "priori-
ties among major program objectives can be rationally determined
only in context of the total program, and balance among all ele-
ments of the Defense effort can be achieved only at the DOD
level". The basic concepts are sound. That there have been
inevitable errors, in cost effectiveness studies and in the
selection of individual weapons systems, should not be a reflec-
tion on the concepts, but in the data and information that went
into the analysis, or in the ultimate decision that was made, or
from changes in the economic situation which could not have been
foreseen.
There should be no substantial change in emphasis on the
3
Planning-Programming-Budgeting concept or in the systems approach.
The change has been in the process since the report of the Hoover
'Johnson, et al., The Theory
,
p. 145.
^Charles J. Hitch, "Retrospect and Prospect", Excerpt
from the H. Rowan Gaither Lectures in Systems Science delivered
at the University of California on 5-9 April 1965.
3Kenneth R. Wheeler, RAdm (SC) USN. Assistant Comptroller
(Financial Management) , Department of the Navy. Address before
the Navy Financial Management Class. 18 March 1969.
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Commission in 1947. "Thus, no matter who comes into Defense,
it is unlikely there will be any major, dramatic changes in the
Defense program." It appears that whatever change occurs will
not be in what has to be done, but in the way it is accomplished,
depending on whether the incumbent Secretary believes in exert-
ing tight leadership control or believes more in delegating
authority to others. Selznick says that centralized decision-
making is necessary at certain stages of the organizational life
cycle. Centralization is thus needed at the beginning of restruc
turing or redefinition of organizational goals:
When top leadership cannot depend on adherence to
its viewpoint, formal controls are required. ... On
the other hand, when the premises of official policy
are well understood and widely accepted, centralization
is more readily dispensable, hence we shall expect a
relatively high degree of centralization ... in the
early stages of institutional development. Later,
when homogeneity has been achieved, decentralization
will be feasible without undue loss of control.
3
Of particular relevance to the on-going total systems
approach in material logistics planning and development has been
the effort on the part of the Department of Defense to foster
standard material logistics systems. That the supply and logis-
tics business in Defense was shaken up is evidenced by the
establishment of the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) in 1962. Its
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
the Government, Budgeting and Accounting: A Report to the Con -
gress (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1949,
p. 8.
2Cyrus Vance as quoted by Borklund, The Department , p. 287.
3Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (Evanston,
111.: Row, Peterson and Company, 1957), p. 113.
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purpose: to provide the most effective and economical support of
common supplies and services to all military services and Defense
components within time frames established by the military mate-
rial priority system, which was itself now a uniform concept.
Simultaneously and in conjunction with the setting up of the DSA,
stock and inventory control, requisitioning and issue procedures,
and record keeping began to be standardized, automated and com-
puterized. The criticism directed against the DSA and the
standard material logistics systems development was of the same
vein as the criticism directed against control of the total
defense effort by the Secretary of Defense: DSA and efforts to
standardize logistics systems were seen as threats to the tradi-
tional concept that the operational commander must control his own
logistics. There is little question, however, from a cost-
effectiveness point of view that the establishment of DSA and the
DOD-directed standard programs have provided for a more effective
Defense total effort. For example, the wholesale back-up concept
inherent in the DSA system of common supply item support has
worked quite well, and has surprised not a few of its earlier
critics with the effectiveness of its support to the operating
forces. Yet there is considerable opinion that perhaps the stand-
ard material logistics systems development in the Department has
Department of Defense, Supply Management Reference
Book
,
DA Pamphlet No. 700-1 (Washington: Office of the Assistant








not moved rapidly enough. There is obviously room for additional
improvements in all functional standard systems development




Of considerable impact on the tendency to increased
central direction and control has been the interest shown by the
Congress. Always concerned with the dollar control of the mili-
tary through the military appropriation system, there has been
additional concern voiced in the Congress over the selection of
specific weapons systems, the effectiveness of systems, including
material logistics systems, and the conduct of the Defense busi-
ness. The General Accounting Office, in its role as the "Watch-
dog of the Congress", has been particularly active in its inqui-
ries over the systemization , standardization and effectiveness of
the military logistics system. The Congress has exerted pressures
which have, in effect, served as extra impetus for the develop-
ment of standardized approaches to automated material logistics
(information) systems.
An important factor contributing to the interest shown by
the Congress has been the dynamic growth of computers used in the
whole of the Federal Government. Billions of dollars of Federal
monies have been invested in the development and installation of
computer systems. The investment in computer and data processing
^Charles A. Bowsher, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Financial Management) , Department of the Navy. Address before
the Navy Financial Management Class. 25 February 1969.
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systems, communications facilities, site preparation, procedures,
software, personnel , training, travel and contractual services has
caused the electronic and data processing system to be regarded
as a major and vital resource to accomplish the primary responsi-
bilities of many Federal agencies.
The growth of computer utilization has not been orderly
throughout the Government, which has resulted in ill -conceived
and incompatable systems development.
The first hard look at utilization of ADP in the Govern-
ment, other than during the annual budget review process, was
taken in 1958 by the Bureau of the Budget. A comprehensive
Government-wide ADP Responsibilities Study recognized the need
of specialized management in ADP resources, for Government-wide
coordination, and for accurate current information for all levels
of management. The dynamic leadership and energetic coordina-
tion, that the study concluded was of vital necessity, never
materialized. A few guidelines were issued. Prior to 1965, the
GAO conducted several comprehensive audits and studies regarding
ADP management, utilization and acquisition, which resulted in
the identification of serious deficiencies in agency ADP acqui-
sition and violation of BuBud guidelines. In reports submitted
to the Congress, the GAO strongly recommended centralized coordi-
nation of the Government's ADP effort.
In 1963, in response to a Congressional request, Presi-
dent Kennedy directed the Bureau of the Budget to undertake a
comprehensive review of Government policies with respect to the
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acquisition and use of automatic data processing equipment and
to prepare a report to Congress. In February 1965 the report was
sent to President Johnson who approved the report's suggestions
for improvement. In its conclusions the report indicated that
there was a definite need to strengthen and augment the resour-
ces devoted to the management of ADP in the Government. The
findings of the report were similar to the BuBud report of 1958,
some of the more important being:
1. The failure to consider all the potential of the new
computer technology in the design of systems.
2. The high degree of incompatibility between systems,
resulting from lack of standardization of equipment and tech-
niques. ADP resource sharing and the exchange of information
between systems was therefore difficult.
3. The absence of procedures for the exchange of data
processing information within and between agencies.
4. The lack of a government-wide automatic data pro-
cessing management information system or plan in existence.
5. The low utilization of ADP equipment among the agen-
cies resulting in excessive costs to the government.
Almost immediately, the Bureau of the Budget was directed to
promulgate to the executive agencies, the responsibilities of
those agencies with respect to the administration and management
'U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Opera-
tions, Report to the President on the Management of Automatic
Data Processing in the Federal Government (Prepared by the Bureau
of Budget) (89th Cong., 1st Sess., Doc. No. 15); Washington:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965.
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of automatic data processing activities. The responsibilities
were set forth in a circular which was intended to provide for
maximum cooperation and coordination between and among the staff
and operating agencies of the executive branch. Specific res-
ponsibilities were given to the Bureau of the Budget, the
General Services Administration, and the heads of the Executive
agencies. The responsibilities included the "merger or integra-
tion of data systems irrespective of intraagency or interagency
organizational lines, when cost effectiveness in equipment uti-
lization, data systems management, or program accomplishment can
2
be increased."
In 1963, the House Subcommittee on Census and Government
Statistics conducted hearings on the use of electronic data
processing equipment in the Federal Government. One of the prin-
cipal purposes was to determine the impact of ADP on Government
employees. In addition to making numerous recommendations con-
cerning machine technology and people, with particular reference
to displaced employees, recommendations were also made concerning
reporting so as to evaluate EDP systems performance, procurement
problems such as lease versus purchase, and standardization of
EDP systems. Concerning the latter, the Committee Report con-
cluded that "Standardization of electronic data processing systems
is vital to the efficient and expeditious use of the systems by
*U. S., Bureau of the Budget, Responsibilities for the
Administration and Management of Automatic Data Processing
Activities
,







the Federal Government, and a serious need exists for a dynamic
standardization program." The House Committee on Government
Operations conducted hearings on the subject that same year. In
1965, hearings were held on H.R. 4845--the "Brooks Bill". The
purpose of the bill: to provide for the economic and efficient
purchase, lease, maintenance, operation, and utilization of auto-
matic data processing equipment by Federal departments and
agencies. After a thorough hearing, the bill, sponsored by
Congressman Jack Brooks of Texas, was passed and became Public
Law 89-306. The Law provided that the General Services Adminis-
tration was responsible for the procurement, utilization and
disposition of automatic data processing equipment; the Depart-
ment of Commerce for the development of data processing standards
and the provision of assistance to agencies in designing computer-
based systems; and the Bureau of the Budget for exercising policy
and fiscal control over the implementation of these authorities.
The President in 1966 issued a memorandum in which he
directed the heads of departments and agencies to apply all
possible means of utilizing the computer to provide better ser-
vice to the public, improve agency performance and to reduce
costs, while managing electronic computer activities at the
U. S., House, Committee on Post Office and Civil Ser-
vice, Use of Electronic Data Processing Equipment in the Federal
Government (88th Cong., 1st Sess., House Report No. 858); Wash-
ington: 0". S. Government Printing Office, 1963.
2 U. S., House. Committee on Government Operations, Report
of the Committee on H.R. 4845 (Automatic Data Processing Equip -
ment ), (,89th Cong., 1st Sess., House Report No. 8UZ) ; Washington:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963.
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lowest possible cost. He directed a reporting system be estab-
lished.
In carrying out certain recommendations of Circular A-71,
the Bureau of the Budget directed the establishment and main-
tenance of an integrated system to provide information for the
management of automatic data processing activities in the Federal
Government. "The Management Information System has been devel-
oped to facilitate and improve the management of the Government-
wide ADP program and the ADP program within and between agencies"
at a variety of levels.
In 1968, the GAO in a report to the House Appropriations
Committee on its inquiry into practices followed by the DOD
components in acquiring and installing new automatic data pro-
cessing equipment for use in computerized management systems,
stated that "the Office of the Secretary of Defense has per-
mitted the services and Defense agencies to develop management
systems unilaterally and independently, without regard to inter-
's
compatibility or relationships of the systems." The GAO recom-
mended that the Secretary of Defense:
'•U. S., The White House, The President's Memorandum to
Heads of Departments and Agencies on "Use and Management of
Computer Technology", June 28, 1966.
^U. S., Bureau of the Budget, ADP Management Information
System
,
Circular No. A-83, April 20, lJST.
U. S., General Accounting Office, Inquiry into Prac -
tices Followed by the Department of Defense Components in
Acquiring and Installing New Automatic Data Processing Equipment
for Use in Computerized Management Systems (Report to the Com-





1. Direct that an overall plan be developed to
serve as a framework within which system improvement
projects are to be developed.
2. Require that the concepts and objectives of
system improvement projects adhere to the concepts and
objectives of the overall plan.
3. Direct that a study be made of the system
improvement projects now underway to ensure that the
projects are in conformity with the DOD management
scheme. "•
The interest for improved practices in the development of
ADP systems can be seen to be on a Government-wide basis. Both
the Congress and the Executive Branch of the Government have
shown considerable interest in maximizing the benefits to be
gained from increased utilization of the computer. The trend to
centralization of policy and control is becoming more evident,
with more inquiry, and study into the way the DOD manages. The
broad-based pressures for systems standardization and integration
between departments, management information systems, computer
sharing dictate continued pursuit by the DOD and Navy to a total
systems approach to planning and development of automated mate-
rial logistics systems development. In reporting on the need for
improved planning to ensure standardization and compatibility
among systems, GAO stated:
It is our opinion that, until DOD devises and imple-
ments one overall plan and the planning and development
of major ADP systems are closely controlled within the
framework of the plan, conditions such as those encoun-
tered by the Navy will continue to occur throughout the












The importance of the human element in Defense as in
business is recognized. The process of introducing complex
systems into organizations is part science and part art. The
science includes the comprehension and design of the technical
parts of the system, and the art involves the process of intro-
duction primarily with regard to the human element. The human
elements are those concerned with attitudes, which are the core
of resistance to change, factors of status, and the informal
relationships that exist in every organization. A manager must
recognize these as valid elements to consider, and important to
the ultimate success of systems efforts.
Many of the ideas of the McNamara revolution can be seen,
conceptually in the several schools of thought of organization
and management theory and policy. Perhaps foremost among them
would be the "management science" school which is concerned
primarily with decision-making, but only with that class of
decisions which can put to use new mathematical techniques and
computers. The purpose is to improve the rationality of deci-
sions. Well publicized, and used in cost-benefit and systems
analysis, are such tools as mathematical and dynamic programming,
symbolic logic, and factor analysis which are useful in coping
with the complexities of an enormous number of variables
^Lawrence K. Williams, "The Human Side of a Systems






interrelated in many different ways so that hundreds, if not
thousands, of possible solutions exist. The tools of probabil-
ity, queuing, decision, and game theory are useful for coping
with variability, the presence of change factors or "acts of
God." The tools of sampling, statistical inference, Monte Carlo
methods, and simulation are tools for coping with lack of in-
formation. There are two major ways in which these operations
research tools have helped top Defense management: 1) they have
provided fresh impetus to taking a system approach to problems,
where emphasis is placed on the interrelatedness of all the sub-
systems or parts that go into making up a complex whole; and 2)
they have provided useful selected techniques in carrying out
the high-level responsibilities of long-range planning and
planning and control of major projects.
Additional schools of thought having impact on the
organization and management methodology of Defense are the
"social system" school and the "empirical" school. The former
places great reliance on the total organization as a cooperative
coalition. A system orientation, this school recognizes the
interdependencies and interrelatedness of the parts in their
contribution— or impediment- -to the goals of the organization.
The "empirical" school recognizes the management as a study of
experience benefiting from all the other schools--a true
2interdisciplinary approach.
Abe Shuchman, Scientific Decision Making in Business,
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., iyo^j
,
pp. 140-148.
^Learned, et al., "Organization Theory and Policy", p. 4-7.
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With respect to leadership styles, the Defense Department
seems to have evolved to a "consultative" type of management, at
the top, and to a certain extent at the middle management level,
as well, rather than to a strict authoritarian style as of old.
Dependent on clear statements of strategy and policy, "consulta-
tive" management, is also dependent on energy, self-control,
ambition, responsibility, creativity, intelligence, group contri-
butions, and clear communications channels. Such factors are
conducive to "bringing along" persons with potential for advance-
ment, and hence is "developmentalist" management.
The frequent criticism heard, that the programming system
and increased reliance on systems analysis have acted to down-
grade the role of military judgment, has been equally often
denied by top Defense civilians, who have stated that uniformed
military planners actually have greater opportunity for influence
2than ever before. It seems fair to say that far more than just
military judgment in the traditional sense, is required and is
entering in to the decision-making process. If the "consulta-
tive" approach to Defense management is seen on the increase,
then it does seem that military "judgment" will play an important
role, but not the only role, in the decision-making process.
The various schools of thought of organization and
management theory have pointed up the interrelatedness of organi-




'Hitch, " Retrospect and Prospect ".
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human behavior. The significance of the impact on managerial
strategy and organizational make-up of the Department of Defense
cannot be measured, but it is believed to be extensive. The con-
tributions of the "management science" school have been of par-
ticular significance to the present day leadership styles and
decision-making process in the Department. Yet, there needs to
be still more emphasis placed on human factors and less on sys-
tems for systems sake, including holding people responsible for
their actions.
The Navy ADP Program
In 1959, the Secretary of the Navy formally established,
in a Navy-wide plan, a long-range goal to have, by 1970, an
integrated management information system within the Department.
It was stated that by the mid-1960' s it was expected to have
installed a full range of ADP/equipment , with adequate technical
personnel on board, having the capability to obtain that long
range objective. During the period 1965 to 1970 it was expected
that the primary developmental activity by Navy components would
be devoted to "the perfection of the best ways and means for
management to constitute itself and use the advanced hardware
and technical personnel- -with a very high degree of common char-
acteristics Navy-wide." 2 The end result was to be an integrated
^Bowsher, address, February 25, 1969.
2 U. S., Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary,
Instruction P10462.7, Navy Data Processing Equipment Program .
16 April 1959, pp. ii-3/
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Navy Management Information System.
To date, the ambitious goal has not been achieved. The
reasons for the delay are more complex than numerous, but the
reason was not because of a lack of technological capability to
develop an integrated system.
The goals established by the Secretary of the Navy in
1959, seem remarkably pertinent today, considering they were
established in an era when automatic data processing equipment
was in its infancy. For instance the long-range plan for an
integrated management information system called for:
- The evaluation of the initial automatic data processing
equipment installations; extension of early experience developed
to all levels of activities.
- An awareness of the full potential of automatic data
processing.
- A shift of application emphasis to the areas of
planning, programming and scheduling, etc., in addition to the
common sense uses stemming from reduction of clerical effort.
- A shift in emphasis to more centrally developed programs
in the design of more optimum management information systems
utilizing operations research techniques.
- A maturity of hardware (third generation computers
with improved input-output capabilities)
.
- The development of an overall Navy plan to bring about
the complete transition of all resources to a full complement of




The 1959 plan proposed a decentralized bottom-up approach
in the design, development, and introduction of ADP equipment and
software. Each bureau and major office in the Navy was assigned
responsibility for ADP systems development within their particu-
lar (chiefly functional) area. The failure to establish bureau
by bureau objectives is reflected in the pace differential with
which each bureau approached the task.
Some seven years after the Air Force had installed its
first workable system, the Secretary of the Navy, in response to
a DOD directive, promulgated plans and procedures for coordina-
tion of management information and data systems within the
Department. Responsibility was placed directly at the highest
level, in the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy
(SASN) . Additionally, the Office of Management Information (OMI)
was established to assist in achieving coordination and compati-
bility. It is noted that it was specifically stressed that "One
objective of this Instruction is to provide the basic plan for
assuring the proper coordination of management information and
data systems without limiting the fundamental responsibilities of
the heads of Departmental components for the development of
management information and data systems". That the fundamental
responsibilities of heads of Departmental components were cited
as being concepts that "were long accepted and strongly
1U. S., Department of the Navy, SecNavInst 5200.14,






supported", was a major contributing factor to the rampant sys-
tem proliferation that followed. The net effect of the continua-
tion of this policy in the datamation area was to continue to
license the bottom-up approach (or at least quasi-bottom-up
approach) , which seems to have proven to considerably delay the
integration of material logistics information systems.
The traditional responsibilities of the traditional
bureaus, functionally oriented, and tending to the parochial in
outlook, could not, without strong central direction
,
help but
orient the development of the slowly evolving automated material
logistics system in a functional and parochial manner. The
strong central direction was absent, and so the "properly and
adequately coordinated [information systems] to assure optimum
compatibility for management purposes" was improbable. Citing
the complexities in data and information design and the high
costs involved as the reasons for slippage of the original goals,
RAdm T. J. Rudden, Deputy Chief of Naval Material (Programs and
Financial Management) , went on to say in an article published in
1967, that progress to date in both systems design and hardware
installation indicates that the objective is feasible. It
appears also that the tremendous acceleration in technological
development in the past ten years, in both ADP and weapons
systems, along with the obvious systems proliferation in the
1 Ibid.
2T. J. Rudden, Jr., Rear Admiral, U. S. N., "Management
Information Systems: The Life Blood of Management", Defense




Naval Material Command (NMC) , as well as in the Navy and DOD as
a whole, is at least a major cause of the slippage. As an exam-
ple, one only has to think of the tremendous task of coordina -
tion necessary, in the presence of guidance and in the absence
of strong central direction and control , in the data elements
and codes standardization program, not only within the NMC, but
throughout the entire Navy where standard DOD programs are being
pushed.
The need for increased control over the use of ADP equip-
ment was becoming more evident in the Navy as well as the Federal
Government as a whole, through the expanding rate of growth of
ADP utilization, and undoubtedly had some bearing on the tremen-
dous reams of paper that were spewing forth in ever increasing
amounts from lower to upper echelons. However, what was forth-
coming was often the wrong information, or merely data rather
than information. The belief that operating levels could by use
of the computer. produce meaningful information for higher eche-
lons was overated. At the higher levels, unwarranted reams of
paper work to produce, for example, 75 copies of a 200 page pro-
gram change proposal, was as a result of having to, in fact,
manually approach and otherwise systemized program.
In 1966 the traditional bureau system in the Navy was
revamped, placing under the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) , the
"material" bureaus, designating them as system commands. At this
1W. D. Gaddis, RAdm USN , Director of Budgets and Reports,
Office of the Comptroller, Department of the Navy. Address be-
fore the Navy Financial Management Class. 4 March 1969.
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time, the project manager concept received increased emphasis,
after the notable success of the Polaris Project. The CNM saw a
need for tying together the new organization through improvements
in the management information system, thus providing for more
effective functioning at the top NMC management level. The need
was corroborated by management consultant findings, which indi-
cated that improvement was possible. It was stated that the
following principles and system characteristics should be pursued
for further development:
- The system must first satisfy requirements for
information essential to the accomplishment of the mis-
sion of the CNM.
- It must be primarily responsive to the management
information requirements of the CNM and his senior staff.
- It must support the task of control, i.e., the
management functions of monitoring, evaluating, report-
ing, coordination, establishing policy, guiding and
directing
.
- It should not duplicate other NMC systems.
- It will, therefore, generally be concerned with
selected summary information produced to a large degree
by the operating systems of lower echelons.
In August of 1966 a joint letter from the Commanders in
Chief of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets advised the Chief of
Naval Operations of serious deficiencies in the quality and quan-
tity of logistics information which was necessary to maintain the
Navy logistics system. Specifically, the letter stated that the
Navy did not have an integrated logistics management capability,
nor did the present organizational concepts provide fleet commanders
Sudden, "Management Information", p. 14
2Joint ltr. from CINCLANTFLT/CINCPACFLT to CNO (CPF
Ser 43/5135J; CLF Ser 2830A/431) of 31 August 1966.
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with an integrated logistics management capability. It also
stated that a system is required to:
1. Respond accurately in a timely manner to queries
of higher authority.
2. Increase credibility.
3. Provide a common reference base.
4. Focus attention on problem areas.
5. Be compatable with existing DOD and other
management systems.
6. Interface with other functional areas such as
operations, intelligence and readiness.
1
The Fleet Commanders, stating urgency in the solution of
the problem was mandatory, recommended that immediate action be
taken to integrate the development of CNO/Fleet/CNM ADP programs
to provide the vehicle for an evolutionary development into a
Navy logistic information system. "The objective of the plan
is therefore to define the problem, coordinate previous actions,
identify interface in functional areas, eliminate duplication,
provide an intended course of action to solve the problem, and
establish an ultimate objective."
The expression of urgent concern regarding the ever
widening gap between the need for logistics information and the
capability to provide it, received immediate reaction by Navy top
management. In early 1967, the Secretary announced the imple-
mentation of a new long-range plan for orderly improvement of
computer-based information systems and automatic data processing
capabilities within the Department. He directed the development
of a Department of the Navy Management Information and Control
•'• Ibid .
, pp . 1-2.
2 Ibid. , encl. (1) p. 1.

77
System (DONMICS) , the concept of which was essential to develop-
ment of management information systems within a Departmental
1 2
master framework . In July of 1968 the concept was promulgated.
The beginnings of more centralized direction over the
development of information and data systems did not occur until
about 1965, despite guidelines and concepts having been issued
six years previously. The bottom-up development of standard sys-
tems for similar types of activities and functional areas was
stressed, and many were developed, but this bottom-up develop-
ment suffered from lack of systems interface. The limited com-
puter capabilities, inadequate communication equipment, and the
lack of in-house ADP expertise have been cited as reasons why it
was considered impractical to attempt to manage ADP systems
development as an integrated whole- -from the top-down. However,
a problem of organization and management, and the absence of a
full appreciation and recognition by top management of the neces-
sity for strong central direction and backing, seem equally
important factors in slippage of the original goals of achieving
an integrated total systems approach to ADP systems development.
U. S., Department of the Navy, SecNavNote 5200 of 4
February 1967.
2 U. S., Department of the Navy, SecNavNote 5200 of 16
July 1968.
''Robert B. Barker, Director, Information Systems Develop'
ment Division, Office of Information Systems Planning and Deve-
lopment, Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Department of the
Navy. Presentation given to the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Logistics) , Conference for review of Auto-




In retrospect, it may seem, perhaps, overly harsh to so judge--I
think not.
In the Fall of 1968, several things were stated to have
occurred since 1965 to have changed the management philosophy:
First- -Third generation computers have been intro-
duced with new capabilities such as: high-speed memories,
faster access to data, cheaper, concurrent processing of
programs, more flexibility, more reliability, and far
better software.
Second- -Communications equipment capabilities have
greatly improved.
Third- -Top management is becoming increasingly con-
cerned at the rising costs of ADP systems and computer
operations, which in Navy are near $250,000,000 annually.
Fourth- -Considerable in-house ADP analysis and
programming talent has evolved.
Fifth- -The President, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Congress have each expressed a personal interest in
improving ADP management-
-
[sic] and in fuller exploita-
tion of the computer's full capabilities.
Sixth- -Secretary Nitze, while Secretary of the
Navy, became concerned because inadequate management
information was reaching the SECNAV/CNO/CMC level on
certain critical programs and directed that action be




THE PRACTICE OF MATERIAL LOGISTICS SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT
Existing Systems
Material logistics is defined as the functional area
that is concerned with the design, development, acquisition,
storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, and disposition
of Navy material. The word "material" is used in its broad
sense to include weapons systems, conventional ammunition,
petroleum, oils, lubricants, and supporting facilities, supplies,
and equipment
.
To an extent this "commodity" definition gives some
indication of the organization of the Naval Material Command
(NMC) , the organization responsible for the material logistics
support needs of the Operating Forces. The NMC has primary
responsibility for the Navy material logistics system, that is,
from the "producer" standpoint, the basic design and develop-
ment of the system. Organizationally, however, the subordinate
"system commands", successor organizations to the "material
bureaus" of long standing, are organized and still operate to
1U.S., Department of the Navy, NAVMATINST 5430.38,






some degree along commodity or functional lines. At the risk
of oversimplification, but by way of illustration, it can be
said that the system commands, such as the Naval Ordinance
Systems Command, the Naval Air Systems Command, and the Naval
Supply Systems Command are only recently exercising their
responsibilities on a systems vice functional basis. There
have been some notable "systems" improvements, under the
"umbrella" of the NMC, as for example the introduction of
important management techniques such as the integrated logistics
support concept. However, the design and development of
material logistics systems have up to 1965 proceeded largely
independent of systems interface and integration. As earlier
discussed this has resulted from a decentralized bottom-up
approach to systems development as well as the lack of an
overall plan.
The introduction of automated data processing capability
into the material logistics systems in the Navy on a decentral-
ized basis has resulted in, and at the same time highlighted,
the rampant systems proliferation referred to earlier. This has
been true in both the functional systems hardware and the
companion management information systems.
Until about three years ago- -there was no central
control in Navy over the development of information
and data systems. Certain guidelines and concepts had
been issued. The development of standard systems for
similar type activities and functional areas was
stressed and many were developed. However, there was
no formal discipline which required ADP systems to be
planned, reviewed, and approved at higher management
levels. Because of the limited computer capabilities,
inadequate communications equipment, and the lack of
in-house ADP expertise, it was considered impractical
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to try to manage ADP systems development efforts from
the top down as an integrated whole.
1
Notwithstanding the virtues of any particular individual
material logistics system, systems have, on-balance, developed
independently of one another. These systems have not met the
requirements of the total systems approach nor have they
possessed the characteristics required by the Navy Material
Management Information System, discussed in Chapters I and II,
respectively.
It would be well to examine two existing major Navy
material logistics systems, the Uniform Automated Data Process-
ing Systems and the Maintenance and Material Management Program
(3-M System) , to determine the adequacy of the ADP utilization
with respect to systems interface and integration. The UADPS
systems, in effect or under development, consist of UADPS for
Supply Management (SM) (Stock Points, Inventory Control Point
and shipboard segments) , Shipyards Management Information System
(MIS), Major Industrial Air Stations (INAS) , Ordinance
Activities (NOMIS) , and Public Works Centers (PWMS) . UADPS (SM)
,
is operational and is the forerunner of the other UADPS systems,
having been under development since the early 1960's. The other
UADPS systems are to varying degrees operational.
The UADPS (SM) is an integrated real-time management
system designed to enhance fleet support and the economical
Barker, presentation, 13 September 1968.
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operation of the Navy Supply System. 1 The scope covers these
interface functional relationships in the Navy Supply System:
purchasing, weapons support, transportation and materials
handling, material funding, accounting, inventory management,
fleet readiness, provisioning, interservice support, catalog-
ing, storage, and reparables maintenance support. The present
ongoing system has evolved because of a recognition of the lack
of standard procedures for Navy supply management, the need for
interface with the Defense Supply Agency System, and the re-
quirement for rapid response to DOD directives, principally in
the area of standard supply logistics procedures. The
increased capability of computer system hardware to process
huge amounts of automated inventory data, the increased demands
for management information, and the required increased in pro-
ductivity in view of the rising costs of supply gave additional
impetus to the development of the standard UADPS (SM) system.
The growth of the Project Manager concept in the weapons support
area gave still further push to a system with the horizontal
and vertical search capability.




Russell A. Jones, Captain, SC, USN, Director Informa-
tion Systems Branch, Program Planning Office, Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy. Presenta-
tion given to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installation
and Logistics) , Conference for Review of Automated Logistics





Full utilization of DOD military standard programs 1
UADPS (SM) was essentially developed on a functional
basis, by the Naval Supply Systems Command. UADPS (SM) develop-
ment was a process of evolution, starting at its beginning with
the standardization of those Navy's stock points and inventory
control points under the control of the Naval Supply Systems
Command. However since all of the Navy's "supply" management
was not under the purview of the Naval Supply Systems Command,
necessarily because of organizational constraints, UADPS (SM)
is not yet a "total system". Nevertheless, significant progress
has been made in the UADPS (SM) segment in the direction of the
total system approach. In addition, several functional areas
contained in the UADPS (SM) scope are not the sole responsibility
of the Naval Supply Systems Command. Accordingly, progress
toward total integrated supply management in the areas of
weapons support, funding, accounting, fleet readiness and
reparables maintenance has moved ahead at a pace less rapid
than desired.
The second major material logistics system here addressed
is the 3-M System. This system, although operational, is still
evolving, and in its own right does not yet meet the require-
ments of the "total system". The system is designed to meet a




expenditure of maintenance resources, manpower and material,
against all ships/aircraft and systems, subsystems and
components thereof. The 3-M System consists of two major sub-
systems: a planning and control subsystem, that tells what,
when, how and with what resources maintenance will be done; and
a maintenance data collection subsystem, that gathers usage
information concerning the specific ship/aircraft, subsystem or
component, which will be used subsequently in future engineer-
ing, technical, and inventory control decisions.
In one measure, the Navy rates itself on the "material
logistics systems scoreboard" as follows:
High
, on centralized design and programming, integrated
files within system, uniform procedures by function, intra-
system communications, interface with DOD-wide systems,
standard functional programs for common tasks , and performance
of operational tasks, and
Low
,
on inter-system communications, machine indepen-
dence, management information systems, standardization (data
elements, documentation, language, software), interservice
compatibility, and systems integration.
The general Accounting Office in commenting on the
management systems of the DOD had this to say about the 3-M
System:
. . . We believe that the basic objectives of the 3-M
System are sound, but it is our opinion that the system
was initiated without sufficient study having been made
to provide clear definitions of what management informa-




Moreover, although this system is interrelated with a
number of other major management systems of the Navy,
it was developed independently of them. It appears
that very little attention was given to the interface
problems among the systems during their initial
development. . . . *
The GAO went on to indicate that the results of their inquiry
into five Military Service and DSA computerized management
systems showed that each of the systems was developed
independently by the respective services and DSA to meet their
individual needs, without regard to achieving interservice
compatibility of common-purpose management systems. Of the
five systems, four were material logistics systems. None of
these systems was designed and developed as part of an overall
2integrated plan within DOD.
The GAO concluded that, "until the DOD devises and
implements one overall plan and the planning and development of
major ADP systems are closely controlled within the framework of
the plan, conditions such as those encountered by the Navy will
continue to occur throughout the DOD at a significant
expenditure of time, effort, and funds." 3
Trends of the Future
What of the future? The Department of the Navy Manage-
ment Information and Control System (DONMICS) concept was
developed to solve the problems earlier associated with previous










Navy efforts to achieve an integrated management information
system. DONMICS provides the conceptual framework to guide the
long-range development of the integrated management information
system. With it should come better planning, focal points pin-
pointing responsibility, adherence to the requirement for
standard data elements and codes, better inventories of equip-
ment and systems, and use of compatible programming languages.
Still required are better and more detailed plans at a
higher, centrally controlled level. A mechanism must be found
to have top management understand and resolve system development
problems associated with organization, management and command
relationships. Total systems compatibility and integration
depends on such resolution. Cost and effectiveness indicators
are required in order for top management to gauge the system(s).
In October 1968, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Logistics) directed that a jointly staffed
group be established to identify common logistics processes and
assure that logistics systems interfaces and integration are
facilitated through a set of common policies and objectives which
would provide the basis for a long-range material management
systems "blueprint".
This blueprint should provide a basis for more economical
use of scarce ADP resources during the long lead time re-
quired for systems development and assure the continuing
usefulness of Military Standard (MILS) procedures in
future logistics systems. In this way, we can assure
that the next generation of systems changes, which will
begin to occur in mid-1970 f s, takes full advantage of the
lessons learned in automation of similar logistics
processes in other DOD Components. To achieve this goal,
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this Office will foster more formal arrangements for
cross-fertilization of ADP systems development,
experiences and ideas.
It appears that there is some unanimity as to the pro-
blems confronting the development of a total systems approach
to automated material logistics development. The Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics)
,
the General Accounting Office and the Department of the Navy
seem to have arrived at substantially the same conclusions.
Translated into the language of the Navy "material logistics
systems scoreboard" what is needed is strong centralized top-
down control, design, and programming on a DOD-wide basis in
order to approach achievement of the total system. The trend
is there. Carried to an extreme this kind of solution would be
both harsh and dangerous. Yet some modification of stronger
central direction and control is required. The continued
proliferation of systems would, of course, be an "un-system".
There remains to be seen what the DOD "blueprint" or the
Navy's NAVLIS Project will bring in the future.
U.S., Department of Defense. Office of the Assistant
Secretary (Installations and Logistics) , "Automated Logistics
Systems Planning," Memorandum for the Assistant Service





The interrelationship between the concept of the total
system and the concept of information systems is evident. Com-
munications, the connecting link in the basic management pro-
cesses, is also the means through which the organization hier-
archy is served by the information system.
A "total information system" might be described as an
information system consisting of at least all information sub-
systems of all components of the entire organization, linked to-
gether through an interfacing data base, manual or automated, and
responsive to the information needs of all levels of the manage-
ment hierarchy, functional as well as system, inorder to support
the goals and objectives of the total organization in the deci-
sion-making process. Integration presupposes minimization, if
not elimination, of redundancy. A total information system is
achieved only by application of a total systems approach.
The total systems approach is thus inherent in the Navy
Logistics Information System (NAVLIS) , the vehicle by which the
NMC intends to interface the various material logistics informa-





NAVY LOGISTICS INFORMATION SYSTEM (NAVLIS) PROJECT
It will be recalled that the Fleet Commanders plea was
for development of a Navy logistics information system. While
the genesis of DONMICS is largely in response to the Fleet Com-
manders call, the specific response to the Fleets was the Navy
Logistics Information System (NAVLIS) established as an operation-
al requirement by the Chief of Naval Operations in December 1967.
The Chief of Naval Material (CNM) was assigned the responsibility,
as the principal developmental agent for Naval logistics. Under
the auspices of the Naval Supply Systems Command, given the task
of developing the proposed technical approach, a NAVLIS workshop
was held at the center for Computer Science and Technology, Na-
tional Bureau of Standards, Gaithersburg , Maryland in March of
1968 under the direction of Rear Admiral T. B. Owen, USN. The
NAVLIS workshop determined that present information systems did
not provide for vertical aggregation of data from the lower orga-
nizational elements into condensed information requirements for
management. It was further determined in that the requirement for
information to support decision-making in the logistics system,
coupled with the unresponsive system for providing information
had resulted in a proliferation of data systems. Approximately
500 automated logistics systems were identified, most of which
were mutually exclusive. In addition to the inability to move
data from one system to another, the lack of data quality control
and the workload caused by redundant input requirements were also
identified as major problems.
The Research and Development Division of the Naval Supply
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Systems Command incorporating the efforts of the Workshop deve-
loped a proposed technical approach which was approved by the
CNM in August of 1968. On 29 November 1968, to provide for the
establishment of exceptional management policies, NAVLIS was
given Project status as NAVLIS Project. (PM 14) under the imme-
diate direction of the CNM. 1 The CNM felt NAVLIS warranted pro-
ject status under his direct supervision to provide "The giving
of particular attention to the management and allocation of
resources assigned to [the] Project which is critical to the
Nation's defense posture and costly to the Department of Defense;
. .
." NAVLIS is an R$D project having as its goal the imple-
mentation of a world-wide material logistics information system.
Establishing NAVLIS as a formal Navy project under a Project
Manager is a definite first. This approach represents a break
with the past. Traditionally, R§D was the exclusive preserve of
weapons systems development, such as Polaris, Surface Missile
System, and the FDL. Management systems were expected to come
into being "automatically" to support the weapon or "hardware"
systems. Until recently, these expectations were generally rea-
lized. Unfortunately, the advent of general purpose computers,
the rapid growth in size of the Naval establishment, and the
tremendous increase in weapons systems complexity have outmoded
the traditional approach. As PM 14, NAVLIS thus represents the
1 U. S. Department of the Navy, NAVMATINST 5430.38, Navy







first major application to management systems of the kind of
long-range planning that has been used successfully in major
weapons systems development.
Project Task
The NAVLIS Project has been tasked with providing all
management echelons with a Navy Logistics Information System
which will satisfy information requirements for approved opera-
tions. Using the existing information systems as a base, the
tasks to be performed by the NAVLIS Project include the defini-
tion, development, test and evaluation, acquisition, initial
installation and support of the NAVLIS System. Included in the
software portions of the Project are survey reports of equip-
ment, data requirements and availability, and standardization
requirements; analytical studies; plans for installation and
tests; system specifications; the development of a simulation
2
capability; and prototype development. The task of interfacing
and integrating various components of the material logistics
system is a task of obvious great magnitude.
Scope
NAVLIS is one of several functional components of
NAICOM/MIS(Navy Integrated Command/Management Information System)
1 S. L. Greenblatt, Program Analyst, Navy Logistics In-
formation Systems (NAVLIS) Project (PM14) , Naval Material Command
Headquarters, Department of the Navy. Personal Interview. 10
April 1969.
2NAVMATINST 5430.38, encl. (1), p. 1.
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of the Chief of Naval Operations. 1 NAICOM/MIS is itself a sub-
system of DONMICS) . As the total material logistics subsystem,
NAVLIS will furnish technical guidance in the development of
logistics modules of command/management information subsystems
external to the Naval Material Command (NMC) , including the
Fleets. NAVLIS will be the principal channel for providing
information input into the logistics module of the NAICOM/MIS.
The NAVLIS concept provides for a data flow from the point of
origin to the point of decision, regardless of the location of
these points, afloat or ashore. This approach provides the com-
plete vertical integration of the material logistics subsystems
of NAICOM/MIS. Interface capabilities will be developed between
NAVLIS and extra-Navy interfaces such as the other military ser-
vices, DSA, and GSA. NAVLIS is the first attempt within the
Navy to view the material logistics system as an integrated
whole.
Initial operation of the first module is scheduled for
FY 1975. Full operation of the NAVLIS is expected by 1980, but
with proper funding and management support, this date could be
advanced by three or four years. The NAVLIS advance development
schedule projected to 1975 testifies to the scope and complexity
of the project. The schedule may prove to be optimistic in view
of experience in the development of other major systems. The
1Xefteris, Zefter C, Capt. (SC) U. S. N. Director, Policy
Development and Review Division, Naval Supply Systems Command





NAVLIS concept does, however, anticipate substantial benefits to
accrue prior to implementation through modular improvement to
existing systems.
All the logistics systems under the purview of the NMC
are NAVLIS related. Accordingly, NAVLIS will be designed to pull
together the management information systems of these subsystems.
The major goal of NAVLIS is to provide the logistics manager with
more responsive, credible, and accurate information than he can
get today. The tool proposed by NAVLIS to mitigate the ineffi-
ciencies inherent in functionally specialized ADP system proli-
feration, is integration. NAVLIS will attempt to integrate these
systems through interface capabilities that will" permit high uti-
lization of the ADP capabilities throughout the entire NMC. The
systems involved in the integration will be the major process
oriented or horizontal systems such as UADPS for Supply Manage-
ment, Shipyards, and Air Stations and the management oriented
or vertical systems such as 3-M and ACCESS. In addition, NAVLIS
will provide input to superior information systems (e.g., DONMICS,
NAICOM/MIS. and the World-wide Military Command and Control Sys-
tem)
,
and will provide guidance in the development of the logis-
tics, segments of information systems outside the NMC (e.g., to
the Fleets)
.
"NAVLIS will be a network of integrated and compatible
supply, maintenance, facilities, and transportation [information]
systems serving both the CONUS and the fleet. NAVLIS is an
extremely costly and complex undertaking. It will require both
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resources and new logistics policy decisions as it progresses
if its objectives are to be achieved".
Objectives
The specific objectives of the NAVLIS are to:
1. Greatly reduce currently inordinate demands on
operating forces for redundant data collection and re-
porting through the concepts of one-time input and source
data automation.
2. Standardize and control proliferation of logis-
tics systems through integration of current systems, and
systems augmentation to encompass .future information
requirement
.
3. Impose discipline on systems development and
operation to eliminate non-uniform procedures and require
adherence to NAVLIS generated guidelines and standards.
4. Effect inter-system communications to permit
data transfer among related systems.
5. Develop and implement new standards and concepts
of quality control to ensure NAVLIS credibility.
6. Significantly improve the quality, quantity,
and timeliness of logistics information to serve the
dynamic needs of management at all levels.
2
Conceptual Approach
In addition to the basic elements involved in developing
systems, eight system design precepts will be incorporated into
the system in order that the objectives can be achieved. The
precepts are intended to overcome those deficiencies or problems
associated with the existing non-integrated systems, namely:
inadequate information for decision-making; proliferation of
systems; inordinate demands on the operating forces; non-uniform
ity of procedures, formats, etc.; inability to move data between
1




3Johnson, The Theory, pp. 341-345.
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systems, lack of effective quality control, and the redundancy
of input and reporting. The eight precepts are:
1. Micro input.
2. Integration of data banks.





8. Inter/ intra service compatibility.
The first precept of micro input involves the entry of data into
the system, in its smallest element, at one time and one place.
Standard data elements and codes will facilitate the identifica-
tion of micro inputs and minimize duplicate inputs into the
system, thereby alleviating the inordinate demands on the operat-
ing forces for burdensome reports. The precept of integration
of data banks does not embrace the notion of a single large data
bank, but rather the use of multiple, geographically dispersed
data banks linked together through a system of equipment, commu-
nications, languages, data elements, codes, and procedure.
On-going efforts in the Navy are oriented to centralized analysis
and programming, the application of the standard COBOL, standard
file structure, and standard data elements and codes. Multiple
use of single inputs provides a significant potential for work-
load reduction and input redundancy. Data aggregation is re-
quired for the development of information from data as it ascends
the management hierarchy. Multi-level access implies the use of
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data at all decision levels. The system must provide access to
data by all levels of management having a need. Vertical search
is the capability of any decision level to search any level of
detail or summarization, independent of this position in the
organization or management structure. This capability is a key
to system responsiveness. The precept of adaptive capability
permits a newly stated query to be placed into the system without
requiring the whole system to be reprogrammed. The precept of
inter/intra service compatibility is the capability of the sys-
tem to interface with similar systems in the DOD.
The system, using an integrated and unified data base,
will assist in decision-making at all levels by providing user
access to all pertinent logistics data, regardless of geographi-
cal or organizational separation. The integrated system will
horizontally and vertically interface with subsystems, and will
be flexible (modular) so that it can accommodate growth in all
directions (such as the introduction of new equipment, new soft-
ware capabilities, organizational changes, and system component
failures)
.
In order to meet the system objectives the following
features will be incorporated into NAVLIS: system-sharing con-
trol; conversational mode query capability; data map module;
data analyses and projection module; report generator; output
configuration control; self -management capability; scheduling
•^-Department of the Navy, Naval Supply Systems Command,





and ADP resource control; communications control; and interface
module
.
The NAVLIS Project, thus envisions a total systems ap-
proach to the development of a Navy Logistics Management Informa-
tion System. This has not been attempted before.
Management Actions Supported
The types of management action supported:
1. Assessment of operational readiness of forces
and identification of critical logistic support needs.
2. Allocation of maintenance and repair resources.
3. Translation of operational plans into logistic
support requirements.
4. Development and maintenance of logistic
planning factors.
5. Maintenance of logistics asset records.
6. Control of logistics asset and acquisitions
dispositions
.
7. Evaluation of operational and contingency plans
for logistics feasibility.
8. Evaluation of logistics support effectiveness.
9. Preparation of budgets.
2
The types of management action supported require utili-
zation of many diverse information systems. A primary advantage
of the NAVLIS concept is the integration of a broad spectrum of
information, which is required for management action, into a
single pool, in readily accessible format. Such an approach will
reduce the need for any proliferation of single function manage-
ment information systems.
Robert M. Weiss, personal interview, Operations Research
Analyst, Navy Logistics Information Systems (NAVLIS) Project
(PM14)
,
Naval Material Command Headquarters, Department of the
Navy, 21 April 1969.
2 Brochure "NAVLIS", p. 23.
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Benefits of the System
The following benefits are sought from the NAVLIS:
1. Provide better information relevant to evaluation
of logistics management.
2. Provide for historical information for the conduct
of logistics analysis.
5. Provide information to conduct feasibility evalua-
tion of logistics decisions through simulation modeling at
required management levels.
4. Make information available, as required, for real-
time management control of on-going systems.
5. Assure continuous system maintainability and relia-
bility to improve the speed, continuity and quality of logistics
information.
6. Minimize human and hardware investment in informa-
tion retrieval operations and low-order decisions.
7. Provide information compatibility intra-Navy and
extra-Navy.
8. Meet user security requirements to protect the inte-
grity of functional subsystems.







Conceptually, NAVLIS is_ a supersystem, or total informa-
tion system, encompassing all Navy material logistics information
systems.
However, NAVLIS must be evaluated as a total information
system in terms of its meeting the needs of the Navy material
logistics organization. To do so, we may examine the System by
comparing it to certain criteria previously discussed. Specifi-
cally the practical application of NAVLIS as a total information
system depends on: 1) the existence of a certain environment,
both external and internal to NAVLIS; and 2) the specific fea-
tures of the System itself. It must, therefore, meet the requi-
sites of both the total system approach and an effective informa-
tion system, which were discussed in Chapters I and II, respec-
tively. These requirements are not, of course, mutually
exclusive
.
The viable total system approach is dependent on: top
management backing; thoroughly defined and understood goals and
objectives; filtered information; communication linkage; auto-
matic data processing capability; building block capability;
optimum standardization of functional systems/subsystems and
integration of the data base; an integrated data bank; and a
competent developmental staff. An effective management informa-
tion system would be an organized method of providing each level
in the management hierarchy with meaningful information to
support the decision-making process. Accordingly, the system
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would satisfy requirements for information essential to mission
accomplishment; be responsive to top management; support the task
of control, monitoring, evaluating, reporting, coordinating,
establishing policy,- guiding and directing; and be integrative,
not duplicative of other interface systems.
The criterion for a total management information system
appear to be met in NAVLIS. Some to a lesser degree than others,
however. The eight design precepts of the NAVLIS system result
in the technological capability to function as an integrated
total material logistics management information system. The
System possesses automatic data processing capability, a filtered
information feature, communication linkage, building block capa-
bility, capability to optimize standardization of functional
systems/subsystems through integration of the data base, and an
integrated data bank, all of which are conditions of the total
systems approach.
If one can accept the total systems approach or the total
information system, then NAVLIS can be said to qualify as both.
Notwithstanding the fact that there are knowledgeable people in
the field that do not accept the concept of a total information
systems as being practical when it comes to the business of day
to day management, I believe we can accept the concept as being
valid, if its practical limitations are recognized.
First, while NAVLIS encompasses all Navy material logis-
tics informations systems, and has been identified by its propo-
nents as a total system, it must be remembered that it is,
itself, a subsystem of DONMICS, the Departmental master
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framework. In this sense, then, NAVLIS as a "total system" has
relevance only if we acknowledge that as a total system it is
limited by the totality of the Navy material logistics informa-
tion systems which it encompasses.
The second practical limitation is that there will always
exist those types of environmental information, that Dearden
referred to as the "five dichotomies of information"
,
primarily
external and futuristic in nature, that will affect and may dis-
rupt the perfecting of the total system.
Third, because the perfection of the total system is
affected by environmental change, the total system becomes evolu-
tionary in growth and operation. The evolutionary development
is, in one sense, good because it prevents the stagnation of
set organizational patterns that lead to parochialism.
Technological considerations may not be the greatest
obstacles to the success of the NAVLIS Project. The potential
problems that may beset NAVLIS concern management- -specif ically
management emphasis. Some of the obstacles to NAVLIS success
could be:
1. Diminishing of present Navy top-management interest
in the total management information systems concept.
2. Funding limitations or cutbacks in either the R$D
phase or the eventual operational phase of NAVLIS.
3. Lip-service to the NAVLIS project management concept
in favor of further decentralized development of data systems
leading to additional systems proliferation.
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4. Well known resistance to change, through genuine
lack of understanding or the parochialism of the "bureau"
system.
5. Lack of progress or slippage in integration of
"super" information systems.
6. Failure of necessary follow through with standard
material logistics systems development at the DOD level.
7. Delay through failure to resolve interface differ-
ences in existing essential operational subsystems.
8. Failure of top -management to provide "strong central





The total system approach is a logical manner in which
to design and develop a goal directed system. To reach a goal,
concrete or abstract, there is one or several alternative ways
to reach the goal, depending on given objectives. The system-
ized approach in reaching a goal considers the environmental
constraints, physical, moral, legal, economic, etc., that are
imposed. A choice among alternatives is available; the choice
should be made in accordance with the goal and objectives. The
more complex the system, e.g., an individual person vis-a-vis
an aircraft carrier, the more important the choice among
alternatives becomes.
Adequate recognition of the super system/subsystem
relationships involved in the material logistics system must be
made. The relationship between material logistics system and
subsystems varies depending on the level of organizational
hierarchy and function. The ultimate goal of the DOD material
logistics system is to support the operating force requirements
of the Defense Establishment. The goal and objectives of any
subordinate segment in the DOD material logistics system should




purpose among all subsystems is fundamental to achieving the
ultimate by optimumly selecting among alternatives.
The environment in which the Navy operates today is at
one and the same time inspiring and frightening; inspiring
because of the unlimited paths that may be taken in the
technological revolution; and frightening because of the need
to have the management ability to take the optimum path.
The technological capability exists to plan and develop
automated material logistics systems on a total system basis.
The total systems approach offers a method of integrating both
program and systems to achieve standardization and compatibility
on a government-wide, as well as DOD and military service
basis. The concept of a total management information system
provides a means by which programs and systems can be
controlled and monitored.
Increased pressure continues from the Congress and the
Executive Branch for centrally directed plans and integrated
systems in the DOD and other agencies. With more and more tax
dollars being funneled into new, socially-oriented programs
these pressures should continue. At the OSD and military
service level there is a growing recognition of the urgent need
for additional standardization and integration in material
logistics planning and development. Favorable experience with
the project management concept, and the proven effectiveness of
the Defense Supply System and the standard "MILS" systems have
served to sharpen the focus on the need.
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The Navy's on-going NAVLIS project and the DOD
"blueprint" study effort are examples of the importance
attached to a total system approach to automated material
logistics planning and development. The present top manage-
ment emphasis must be continued. There are indications that
the trend to systems integration will continue at perhaps an
even faster pace than heretofor. Organizational change
considerations should be made. Existing organizational
patterns in the DOD or Navy should not be allowed to impede
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